



3 September 2008

NTF Programme Stakeholders:

Please find attached the final report of the Independent Mid-Term Evaluation of the NATO/PfP Trust Fund Programme in Bosnia and Herzegovina. While, like any evaluation ought, the emphasis is placed upon areas for improvement, it must be recognised that the NTF Programme was successful and had a positive economic impact upon its beneficiaries. Sustainability, ownership and multiplier effects were evident, and the Executing Agency has wisely taken steps to further enhance sustainability through sub-grant initiatives which should be supported and granted sufficient time to be effective.

Several areas for improvement are offered. The single largest such area, which pertains to Ministry of Defence capacity building, concerns the Programme's design and the perceptions and objectives of those who established it rather than any misstep taken by IOM. Other areas pertaining to the nuances of implementation and various individual forms of assistance are offered in order to promote the improvement of an already successful intervention rather than as an indictment. IOM should be commended for their work, the Lead Nations for their support, NATO for its role in Defence Reform and the MOD for its facilitation and engagement.

The evaluation team's sincere hope is that this intervention and the Trust Fund itself be continued in order to multiply the economic benefits achieved by beneficiaries, to assist future redundant or discharged personnel and to provide an effective learning opportunity for the MOD. IOM, based on its evident success and process of gaining lessons learned and best practices in the course of this intervention, should remain an integral part of future activities in this sector.

Sincerely,

Sultan Barakat  
*Team Leader*



## **Draft Final Report**

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NATO/PFP TRUST FUND (NTF) PROGRAMME FOR ASSISTANCE  
TO REDUNDANT MILITARY PERSONNEL IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

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## **INDEPENDENT MID-TERM EVALUATION**

**25 AUGUST 2008**

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## Acronyms & Abbreviations

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<b>AoR</b>	Area of Responsibility
<b>BEAC</b>	Bids Evaluation and Awards Committee
<b>BICC</b>	Bonn International Centre for Conversion
<b>BiH</b>	Bosnia and Herzegovina
<b>CoM</b>	Chief of Mission, IOM
<b>DDR</b>	Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
<b>FBiH</b>	The Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina
<b>ICRS</b>	Information, Counselling and Referral Services
<b>IOM</b>	International Organisation for Migration
<b>LSB</b>	Local Steering Board
<b>MoCA</b>	Ministry of Civil Affairs
<b>MOD</b>	Ministry of Defence
<b>NTF</b>	NATO Trust Fund
<b>OHR</b>	Office of the High Representative
<b>PfP</b>	Partnership for Peace
<b>PoC</b>	Point of Contact
<b>PRDU</b>	Post-war Reconstruction and Development Unit
<b>RAPP</b>	Reintegration Assistance Project Proposal
<b>RP</b>	Redundant Personnel (used interchangeably with 'beneficiary')
<b>RS</b>	Republika Srpska



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## Acknowledgements

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The authors of this report would like to acknowledge the help of several individuals within the production of this evaluation. These include, first and foremost, all NTF Programme beneficiaries who took time from their families and livelihoods to speak with the evaluation team. The same gratitude applies to representatives of the Ministry of Defence (MOD), particularly the Assistant Minister of Defence for Personnel and the Transition Team, whose insight and candour was integral in producing this report. The input of the Principle Deputy High Representative, Dr Raffi Gregorian, helped to situate Defence Report, military downsizing in particular, within the broader political and security context. Finally, Dr Alpaslan Ozerdem of the University of York's Post-war Reconstruction and Development Unit (PRDU), an advisor on this evaluation, offered sound advice regarding the methodology and analysis as well as regarding international best practices.

Within IOM, Chief of Mission Regina Boucault and Programme Manager Katie Kerr, in particular, approached this evaluation transparently, critically and reflectively, using it as an opportunity to better understand how to assist IOM's beneficiaries. Their facilitation as well the guidance and insight provided by Team Leaders Tatjana Kreco, Drazan Rozic and Mladen Kakuca was greatly appreciated.

The Post-war Reconstruction and Development Unit (PRDU) at the University of York, which conducted the evaluation, would like to acknowledge Ms Jenny Hunt and Ms Sally Carter for their assistance with research and administration.

**Sultan Barakat & Steven A Zyck**



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## Executive Summary

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The NATO/PfP Trust Fund Programme for Redundant Military Personnel in Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereafter, 'the NTF Programme') aimed 'to facilitate the resettlement, into civilian and economic life, of persons who are going to be discharged in the course of the defense reform process over 2006 and 2007, and also those who were demobilized through previous staff downsizing in 2004' ('Project Document', p. 3). The Programme's mid-term evaluation attempted to assess the degree to which this objective had been reached with particular attention towards programme design, institutional strengthening, implementation and impact. The overall finding is that the Programme successfully met its objective and improved, with minor exceptions, the economic circumstances of its beneficiaries. Critical observations are, however, made, particularly in relation to governmental capacity building, sustainability and initial implementation arrangements.

### Methodology

The design, institutional and programmatic impact and internal processes and management of the NTF Programme were evaluated during 16 person-days in Bosnia and Herzegovina by Sultan Barakat and Steven A Zyck between 3 and 15 August 2008. The evaluation consisted of:

- 30 interviews with NTF Programme beneficiaries (and, in many cases, their family members or co-workers);
- 19 interviews with institutional stakeholders from the Ministry of Defence, Lead Nations, NATO and various other international and BiH governmental representatives;
- 93 surveys of NTF Programme beneficiaries;
- Interviews with 16 IOM staff members engaged in the NTF Programme;
- An extensive document review pertaining to the NTF Programme and previous interventions targeting demobilised military personnel in BiH and the region.

The methodology was found to be sufficient for gaining multiple perspectives on the Programme and its relation to security and development.

### Design

The evaluation team determined a number of strengths and weaknesses with the Programme's design. These include:

- A flexible approach to livelihoods which fostered beneficiary ownership but which still failed to address many differences among beneficiaries (based on year of redundancy, former rank or gender);
- A sustainable approach to basic livelihoods which, prior to the recent inclusion of technically advanced 'sustainability initiatives', did not adequately address issues related to 'economic networking' through associations, cooperatives or other similar entities;
- The marginal and primarily logistical role envisioned for the MOD and the unfortunate removal of MOD capacity building from the Programme;
- The initially planned but practically non-existent role played by governmental institutions beyond the MOD.



The design was, however, reflective of many best practices and is a significant improvement upon past interventions to support former military personnel in BiH.

## Impact

The Programme's impact was widespread and generally positive though limited in its scale by the amount of assistance provided to each beneficiary. It offered excellent support to existing livelihoods though was not generally substantial enough to allow for the creation of entirely new enterprises. More specifically, the impact includes:

- Common increases in income of 5 to 20 per cent among beneficiaries and, in a significant minority of cases, gains ranging from 30 to 300 per cent;
- Greatest improvements were seen in relation to employment and self-employment expansion options and least among those who had received agriculture and self-employment start-up assistance;
- High degrees of beneficiary ownership and sustainability are evident, and more should be done to ensure that existing and impressive multiplier effects are extended.

That said, several beneficiaries had not yet been able to utilise or receive the full benefits of their assistance, particularly those who had begun the long-term process of starting entirely new enterprises or those receiving education or training through the Programme. In some cases, particularly those involving female beneficiaries and recipients of certain forms of agricultural assistance, the Programme produced unanticipated and negative social and financial ramifications. Future monitoring and a long-term impact evaluation – according to rigorous but currently absent indicators – should be planned to measure the full effects of the Programme.

## Implementation

Programme management was found to be highly cognizant and pro-active in response to all problem areas and challenges. The implementation was done well despite delays, early modifications in implementation arrangements and the somewhat surprising lack of an implementation manual for the NTF Programme. Additional issues pertaining to implementation include:

- The unfortunate delays in implementation due, primarily, to uncertainty regarding the number of individuals to be made redundant in 2006/7;
- The resulting shortened amount of time available for implementation, and the need to improve the pace of implementation in order to allow for additional time for monitoring, sustainability initiatives, supplementary assistance schemes, the capacity building of the MOD and other priorities;
- Challenges posed by procurement, suppliers and the rising costs of items requested by beneficiaries.

Such implementation challenges resulted in delays and had repercussions for the quality and quantity of assistance provided. Opportunities to correct them do, however, still exist.

## Recommendations

Several recommendations are made by the evaluation team. While it is recommended that specific suggestions be reviewed carefully in Section 6 of this report, the most critical include the need:



- To step-up, within and beyond this Programme, attention to MOD capacity building and the coordination of all governmental institutions which are likely to be involved in the post-service transition of military personnel;
- To pursue MOD capacity building through the provision, during the remainder of this Programme and in future interventions, a greater role in the design, delivery and monitoring of assistance for redundant or otherwise discharged personnel;
- To provide additional funding and time – through an extension through, at least, September 2009 – to support sustainability initiatives given that such interventions have the potential to significantly magnify the Programme’s long-term social and economic impacts;
- To promote the networking of beneficiaries into cooperatives, associations and groups – whether comprised primarily or only partly by beneficiaries – in order to facilitate the delivery of assistance (including that offered by municipal governments) and larger-scale market integration;
- To improve the pace of implementation by transferring mid-Programme monitoring duties to ‘peer monitors’ (selected among beneficiaries) or local NGOs and by streamlining the approval process of individual beneficiary assistance plans (known as RAPPs);
- To ensure the maintenance of the NATO/PfP Trust Fund in order to support MOD capacity building (in-line with NATO expectations) and future assistance for soldiers and MOD personnel making the post-service transition.

Through these recommendations, the Programme’s success and sustainability could be substantially expanded.



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## 1. Introduction & Overview

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The NATO/PfP Trust Fund Programme for Redundant Military Personnel in Bosnia and Herzegovina has been implemented since 2006 with the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) serving as the Executing Agency. The stated goal of this Programme, to assist in the reintegration of individuals made redundant during the Defence Reform process, was pursued through a highly flexible and individualised livelihoods approach.

This evaluation has sought to evaluate the overall appropriateness of the Programme's design, the quality of its implementation and the extent of its impact. Furthermore, it has aimed to assess the contributions which the Programme has made to the Ministry of Defence's capacity to implement similar post-service transition interventions in the future. While capacity development was removed as an objective from the Programme – unwisely in the view of this evaluation – it is necessary to understand what gains can be achieved during the remainder of this intervention and through future projects and technical assistance Programmes.

The NTF Programme marks the fourth international intervention to support demobilised military personnel in Bosnia and Herzegovina since it emerged from conflict a dozen years ago. Its predecessors – the World Bank's Emergency Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme (EDRP) and Pilot Emergency Labour Redeployment Programme (PELRP) and IOM's Transitional Assistance to Demobilised Soldiers (TADS) programme – have been implemented with a view to immediate post-demobilisation security (or 'spoiler') concerns. With the NTF Programme – despite politico-security concerns emanating from ethno-nationalist political figures – comes an opportunity to make a full transition from basic livelihoods in the unstable post-conflict phase to more comprehensive economic development assistance. This current Programme also presents a need – somewhat novel in IOM's experience with post-combatant transitions – to establish models which are replicable by the national, host government.

In order to assess the fulfilment of these goals– to sustainably reintegrate demobilised military personnel and to beneficially contribute to the State's capacity – the three-person evaluation team conducted a total of 16 person-days within Bosnia and Herzegovina. During this time they interviewed 30 Programme beneficiaries, 19 institutional stakeholders and 16 of the 24 IOM personnel directly engaged with the Programme. IOM, simultaneously, conducted a survey designed by the evaluation team with 93 beneficiaries. In total, the evaluators were able to gain interview or survey data from almost 14 per cent of already-assisted beneficiaries. A high degree of reliability is attributed to the data, despite the significant role played by IOM in facilitating the evaluation, though the short amount of time which had elapsed since the delivery of assistance (generally 1-4 months) means that impact-oriented indicators and findings should be understood as preliminary.

The findings are, in brief, that the NTF Programme's design was flexible and appropriate for the context but that, prior to the addition of 'sustainability initiatives' (or sub-grants, as they are also known) too little attention was paid to market integration and long-term economic growth. The decision to remove Ministry of Defence (MOD) capacity building from the Programme, while understandable given the evident lack of MOD structures, capacities and personnel at the time when the decision was made, is regrettable and resulted in a missed opportunity to support one of Bosnia and Herzegovina's few national symbols. Steps taken, such as the previous and future organisation of workshops with the MOD Transition Team and the creation of a supplemental Programme to address MOD capacity building, are viewed highly favourably and should receive broad support from donors.



The Programme's impact on State institutions, particularly the MOD, has been limited. However, when considering that IOM was not formally charged with any efforts in this regard, the efforts made are admirable and go 'above and beyond' the Lead Nations' or evaluator's formal expectations. MOD personnel were found to have a strong interest in taking a greater role in reintegration assistance for demobilised personnel and had hoped, during the remainder of implementation, to become more heavily involved in the operations of the NTF Programme.

The Programme's impact upon beneficiaries has been largely though not entirely positive. Economic benefits resulting from NTF assistance was seen in almost every case, and gains appeared to be sustainable. A high degree of beneficiary 'ownership' existed and can be attributed entirely to IOM's emphasis on a successful information campaign and the recipient-led selection and procurement of assistance. For many, the process of receiving NTF assistance required them to engage in long-term planning regarding their economic future, and it impelled impressive rates of independent beneficiary contributions.

Exceptions to this broadly positive impact do, however, exist. Women, while often benefiting economically from the assistance received, were often marginalised in the process with their husbands or IOM staff members taking an increased and not necessarily appropriate role. Similarly, a small proportion of beneficiaries selecting agriculture assistance faced unanticipated expenses linked to the items received. Those attempting to use the NTF Programme's relatively meagre level of assistance – 2,400 to 3,200 KM (1,200 to 1,600 EUR) per person<sup>1</sup> – to start a small business often found it impossible to do so and had not yet begun to benefit from the assistance received. High degrees of success, however, were found among those beneficiaries using assistance to expand existing businesses or secure long-term employment.

Programme management was, similarly, found to be commendable. Despite early modifications in implementation arrangements and tools, the process now operates smoothly and effectively. Still, initial delays in Programme implementation, attributable primarily to the unavailability of lists of to-be-made-redundant personnel, must be met with increased rates of implementation in order to allow for a timely completion, the oversight of 'sustainability initiatives', supplemental assistance packages, extensive internal monitoring, additional MOD capacity building and a yet-unplanned final evaluation. The flexibility required of IOM must also be met by flexibility on the part of NATO and the Lead Nations. An extension of at least three months, moving the end-date to 30 June 2009, should be viewed as minimal. For sustainability initiatives to be fully and successfully implemented – given that the creation and training of an agricultural cooperative, for instance, requires an entire agricultural season – an extension of up to if not more than six months (through at least September 2009) should be considered. Furthermore, additional funds for such sustainability initiatives should be allocated, if possible, by donors. The evaluation team found that such initiatives have the potential, with a small addition of time and capital, to have the potential to convert a laudable livelihoods intervention into a long-term economic development initiative.

Additional recommendations are made within these pages. Most notably, these include the following:

- Increase the role of the MOD Transition Team in implementation planning and supervision and in coordination mechanisms such as LSB meetings.
- Support future MOD capacity development activities, particularly when combined with tangible planning for financially-viable, State-owned

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<sup>1</sup> It should be noted that this range of assistance was established mid-way during the Programme and that initial levels of assistance were at times as low as 1,000 KM (500 EUR, approx.).



interventions to support the routine post-service transition ((a term the evaluators preferred to 'resettlement' or 'reintegration') of personnel from the military and MOD.

- Engage governmental stakeholders outside of the MOD in the provision of future post-service transition assistance without contributing to the role of the entities. This would, most likely, necessitate the direct involvement of municipal authorities.
- Develop basic gender guidelines to guide the remainder of implementation, and begin work on a gender-strategy in close consultation with, among others, the MOD Transition Team and the State-level Ministry of Civil Affairs (MoCA).
- An implementation manual should be created. While its use for the remainder of this Programme would likely be limited, it could provide a significant jumping-off point for future MOD Transition Team efforts.
- Internal monitoring and other non-implementation duties of IOM field staff should be temporarily suspended and handed over to beneficiary 'peer' monitors or local NGOs in order to allow for an improved pace of implementation.
- Communication between field offices should be prioritised, and the sharing of best practices should be accompanied by Management directives mandating their use.
- A final evaluation should be planned and financed, and the firm hired to conduct it should be required to closely and fully involve the MOD Transition Team. To the degree possible, this final evaluation should result not only in a presentation of findings but also with a capacity development and lessons-learned workshop joining IOM, the MOD and other governmental stakeholders relevant to but not necessarily involved in the NTF Programme.
- The NATO/PfP Trust Fund should be prolonged, given its proven ability to attract donor support, and should be imbued with the genuine philosophy of the trust fund – to promote government ownership and capacity building. It should be the primary mechanism through which the international community continues to support Defence Reform and, in particular, the MOD's ability to independently provide post-service transition assistance.

Despite evident areas for improvement in institution building, impact and management, the evaluation found that the NTF Programme had met its objective and had positively contributed to the livelihoods of hundreds of beneficiaries and their households. The institution building and MOD capacity development which has occurred was not required nor necessarily expected and should be applauded.

Perhaps the most critical finding of this evaluation is that the momentum gained – whether in terms of developing the MOD Transition Team or in promoting the livelihoods of beneficiaries – cannot be lost once this programme comes to an end next year.



## 2. Evaluation Methodology

This evaluation relied upon interviews with key institutional stakeholders, beneficiaries, Programme staff members and a 27-question survey delivered by IOM to 93 Redundant Personnel (RPs). While informants are referenced in Annexes A and B, they included a range of individuals including Lead Nations representatives, NATO officials, Ministry of Defence officials, other international stakeholders and a wide range of beneficiaries.

### 2.1 Sample Size

The 30 beneficiaries with whom the evaluation team consulted were selected by IOM based on a series of highly stringent criteria related to age, gender, location, type of assistance received and disability, among others, in order to ensure a representative sample. Only one case previously highlighted as a 'success story' in an IOM publication was interviewed, and the evaluation team strongly feels as if the final sample was diverse and broadly reflective of the different experiences – both successful and less so – with the NTF Programme. The sample size, 3.5 per cent of all assisted beneficiaries at the time of the evaluation, was considered sufficient to yield generalizable results. It can be broken down in the following ways.

- **Year of Redundancy:** 26 from 2004, 4 from 2006/7
- **Gender:** 25 male, 5 female
- **Location:** 11 in Banja Luka AoR, 11 in Mostar AoR, 8 in Rajlovac AoR
- **Context:** 18 rural, 7 urban, 5 suburban

Additional individuals made redundant in 2006/7 were sought, though few had previously been assisted and were located within an appropriate driving distance from the IOM Field Offices. The type of assistance received by these individuals also closely reflected the proportion thus far delivered to NTF Programme beneficiaries

**Table 1.** Sample Size, by type of assistance received

Type	Assisted (%) <sup>2</sup>	Sampled (%)
Agriculture	68	43
Self-Employment Start-Up	13	20
Self-Employment Expansion	13	20
Employment Assistance	4	10
Education/Training	2	7

As is evident, the pool of agriculture assistance recipients is under-represented in the sample while other categories have been over-represented. This deviation from the assisted beneficiary pool was intended in order to gain a closer understanding of all types of assistance. For example, strict adherence to the proportional breakdown of the beneficiary pool would have only involved interviews with four self-employment (start-up) beneficiaries and one employment assistance recipient. Such low numbers would have made it impossible to draw credible conclusions regarding these forms of assistance. The same was done, for instance, in the case of gender, with women comprising only 12 per cent of the beneficiary pool but almost 17 per cent of the beneficiary interview sample.

<sup>2</sup> Based on NATO/PfP Trust Fund Programme Newsletter No. 6, June 2008.



## 2.2 Key Questions

The following questions, based upon the evaluation terms of reference, were proposed and addressed by the evaluation team.

- What outcomes have resulted from the Programme?
- To what degree has it achieved its overall objective and its specific indicators?
- How efficiently have these achievements and outcomes been achieved?
- What role has Programme design, as opposed to Programme implementation, played in its achievements and efficiency?
- What improvements in design, implementation and efficiency/effectiveness seem possible?
- What specific corrective action should be taken to address these?
- What best practices and lessons learned can be identified within IOM's Programme? Have can achievements be strengthened, solidified and disseminated?
- What data-based lessons applicable to IOM's Programme can be drawn from other DDR and related programmes elsewhere in the world and, specifically, from within the region?
- How can evolving research and standards be applied to the Programme and to this and future IOM programmes?
- How has IOM's Programme affected the Ministry of Defence's capacity to implement resettlement activities? What capacity deficits remain, and how can they be addressed during and through the remaining Programme implementation?

These questions were applied as intended, though greater attention, in particular, was paid to the issues of effectiveness, operational processes/efficiency and institutional capacity building than had initially been intended. Furthermore, the intended measurement of specific output and impact indicators was not, ultimately, possible, given the rather surprising lack of specific targets in the Programme documents.

## 2.3 Data Collection Tools

The evaluation team utilised various data-collection tools in conducting this evaluation. Specific questions for institutional stakeholders, such as Lead Nation representatives and the BiH MOD Transition Team, were developed and applied, though a conversational approach was most commonly taken.

### 2.3.1 Beneficiary Interviews

Programme beneficiaries were subject both to semi-structured interviews and surveys. The interviews, conducted by the primary investigator, were based on a lengthy interview protocol. This protocol was shortened in order to allow a sufficient sample size to be reached, though the four main categories of inquiry remained consistent throughout each:

- **Background Information:** This pertained to the RP's particular duration of service, previous rank/position, age, date of redundancy and reason for leaving the military or entity-level MOD. This section also attempted to better understand any particular individual circumstances and, in particular, the beneficiary's source(s) of income since leaving the military or MOD.
- **Process Information:** In this portion of the interview, beneficiaries discussed the step-by-step process through which they learned of the Programme, registered for assistance, received counselling from IOM staff members, selected a



particular type of assistance and received the selected items or services. A great deal of emphasis was placed on the sources of information (efficacy of the information campaign), on the duration of the process and the time lapsed between individual steps, on the content of the IOM 'counselling', on the relevance (appropriateness) of the assistance selected and on the procurement and delivery process.

- **Impact/Effectiveness:** This portion of the interview attempted to garner the economic gains directly attributable to the assistance received through the NTF Programme. As most beneficiaries had received assistance only very recently, it was frequently necessary to ask for anticipated benefits. The interviewer also attempted to determine whether routes for further impact were available, such as through improved marketing, and attempted to determine whether these had been noted or highlighted by IOM staff members working with that particular beneficiary. The sustainability of livelihoods was also examined in this section of the interview.
- **Additional Assistance/Programmatic Modifications:** The final part of the interview was the most open-ended and asked beneficiaries what additional forms of assistance would improve the success or sustainability of their enterprises. They were also invited to propose modifications in the Programme. In both cases, they were reminded that the interviewer did not represent IOM or the NTF Programme's donors and that such questions should not create an expectation of additional assistance.

Each interview lasted approximately 45 to 60 minutes and was commonly conducted in the presence of family members. The presence of such individuals proved highly beneficial in more greatly understanding the Programme's impact on secondary beneficiaries. Such individuals often displayed a candour regarding the Programme which the beneficiaries, out of a desire to be hospitable and express gratitude, may have been less willing to express. Their presence did not seem constraining in any way.

### **2.3.2 Beneficiary Surveys**

The evaluation team also utilised surveys in order to gather a broader swath of information from beneficiaries. Ninety-three surveys were conducted by IOM staff members between 5 and 15 August 2008. The goal of the surveys was to quickly obtain information pertaining to: (i) whether they were 'better off' relative to pre-redundancy employment (in the military or MOD) and immediate post-redundancy employment; (ii) profits and capital investments; (iii) sustainability; (iv) identity, self-perception and social reintegration; and (v) the quality of IOM livelihoods counselling. The survey form is included within Annex C of this report.

Data collected through the survey was recorded and analysed in order to analyse the results of individual questions and to determine whether correlations exist between different findings. While survey results are cited throughout this report, additional statistics are available in Annex D.

## **2.4 Methodological Issues**

The methodology proved effective in analysing the Programme. First-hand observations by the evaluation team were able to be compared with largely anonymous surveys in order to account for any bias resulting from the presence of an international monitor. Constant consultations with IOM staff members and institutional stakeholders from the Lead Nations, NATO, the Ministry of Defence and elsewhere put field-based findings into the broader political, developmental and security context.



Concerns may arise, however, concerning the substantial role played by IOM within the evaluation. Interpretation was done by IOM personnel with beneficiaries and institutional stakeholders, where necessary. This arrangement was requested by the evaluation team, as it commonly does, out of a desire to ensure that translators were familiar with the Programme and with relevant thematic areas such as agriculture and small business assistance. Overall, the involvement of IOM personnel as translators did not seem to influence the results provided, and IOM staff members frequently expressed serious concerns with the design and delivery of the Programme to the evaluation team. Steps were taken, however, to minimise any potential bias:

- Beneficiaries were informed that their answers would not have any influence on the type of amount of assistance they would receive in the future.
- Translators were instructed to provide direct translation even in the event that the RP's meaning was unclear or was perceived to be erroneous.
- 'Side conversations' between beneficiaries and translators whereby they clarify the content prior to translation, were disallowed.

While such steps are not necessarily able to fully remove the potential for biased translations, the sometimes negative comments provided by beneficiaries helped to allay concerns that criticisms of the Programme would be ignored or downplayed. Still, it is recommended that future 'independent' evaluations be commissioned by the MOD, ideally, or alternatively by NATO or one of the Lead Nations.



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## 3. Design & Institutional Arrangements

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The Programme's design was flexible and allowed for high rates of beneficiary ownership. It was not, however, novel and failed to include innovations and modifications based on international best practices and emerging research. These were, however, most notably found in its institutional rather than programmatic design.

### 3.1 Institutional Relevance & Design

The NTF Programme entered into a highly unique political and institutional context. Unlike previous demobilisations in post-conflict BiH, it occurred within the context of defence reform and the consolidation of the two entity-level ministries of defence into a single, national institution. The complexity of this process was, during the design phase, taken to negate or render impossible extensive governmental involvement. The evaluation team found this decision to be inappropriate and feels that, given the complex political and institutional context, more rather than less State involvement was necessary.

#### 3.1.1 Ministry of Defence

The BiH MOD was given a relatively minor role within the NTF Programme. According to the documentation, its primary responsibility was to provide lists of personnel to be made redundant, office space, vehicles and computer equipment to IOM. A greater role for the MOD, one which would have included MOD personnel working alongside IOM implementing staff, was initially proposed during the design phase but was removed due to concerns over the high rate of turnover within the MOD. It was frequently noted that the MOD personnel initially involved in designing the Programme were themselves uncertain as to whether or not they would be made redundant. The inability to ensure sufficient stability in order to support the reintegration of redundant personnel represents a failure on the part of the MOD and one which, it must also be noted, NATO and other members of the international community should have helped to overcome through political pressure or financial inducements.

Regardless, more flexibility should have been demonstrated in order to involve the MOD more fully in the Programme. While in a hectic period of transition during the planning of the NTF Programme – a transition which continues at present – improved stability within the MOD was anticipated. As such, the design could have incorporated a system whereby increased responsibility for Programme oversight would be dependent upon the establishment of key institutions – such as the Transition Team or position of Assistant Minister for Personnel – within the MOD. The identification of such milestones could have further provided a clear message to an institution which, according to one staff member within the MOD, felt itself to be held accountable to expectations which were frequently made only indirectly.

Ensuring governmental involvement is not simply an end within itself, a box to be checked, but a necessary precondition for institutional sustainability. Regardless of the quality of interventions and the sustainability of livelihoods generated, the NTF Programme will require repetition in the future if the MOD is not able to independently manage post-service transition activities in either the event of another large-scale downsizing or in relation to normal personnel outflows (discharge, retirement, etc.). Promising steps in this direction have been taken by the MOD Transition Team, including the development of a capacity building-oriented 'Action Plan' and a draft Policy. These policy-oriented and strategic documents will require tangible support and follow up.

While the capacities necessary to do so can be learned, to an extent, through trainings, seminars and other educational experiences, on-the-job learning is far more useful. Even



the best capacity development programme is no substitute for gaining practical experience designing and implementing interventions. Though it is encouraging to see that future MOD capacity building activities are being planned for the Transition Team with at least Norwegian and UK support, the evaluation team would have preferred a more hands-on approach incorporated within the NTF Programme. It may be wise to ensure that the proposed capacity development programme include a considerable practical component through which IOM, for instance, works alongside the Transition Team in providing post-transition assistance to soldiers departing the military.

### **3.1.2 Other Governmental Stakeholders**

Programme documents<sup>3</sup> indicate that the BiH government – specifically the ministries of health, education, labour and agriculture – will be engaged in this Programme in a comprehensive manner. Representatives of the national Ministry of Civil Affairs’ education sector and the entity-level Employment Institutes indicated a very limited awareness of the Programme. While there are multiple potential reasons for this lack of awareness – including the passage of time or changes of personnel within the governmental institutions – it may be time to refresh these connections. Such ‘refresher’ contacts may wish to target permanent staff within the middle management, particularly at the municipal level, rather than those in senior levels whose tenure may be short-lived and whose relation to on-the-ground activities may be limited.

The reintegration of redundant personnel and, in the future, routinely discharged individuals will continue to rely upon the close involvement of the Employment Institutes, the ministries of education and agriculture and other public sector institutions. They must be actively involved in the process, and financial incentives must be provided in order to ensure that they have not only the mandate but also the means and motivation to provide tangible assistance. It may, indeed, be wise to consider the direct involvement of the State as implementing partners in future assistance targeting redundant or otherwise discharged military personnel.

The only governmental stakeholders beyond the MOD which were successfully (though only partially) included within the Programme were the municipal governments. Municipal authorities, though not initially included as stakeholders within Programme documents, were, in most cases, well aware of the NTF Programme. While only a few municipal governments were able to provide additional support to Programme beneficiaries, attempts to link beneficiaries with municipal services should be promoted in the future. Indeed, municipal governments or public structures at the municipal level could provide effective implementing partners in future interventions given their geographical diffusion and seemingly technically qualified staffs.

### **3.1.3 The NATO/PfP Trust Fund Model**

The NATO/PfP Trust Fund (NTF) has amassed support from multiple donors and provided a reliable stream of financing for the NTF Programme. However, its design, reflective of NATO’s broader approach towards MDTFs, is not properly aligned with the origins or best practices of donor financing.

Multi-donor trust funds (MDTFs) were developed in order to allow not only for the consolidation of financing from multiple donors but also to promote increased ownership and control by the recipient government. MDTFs were, in essence, intended to serve as extensions of the national budgetary process. Furthermore, the long-term nature of the MDTF was, like an endowment, intended to generate investment income while funds – to be not only committed but actually provided in advance of their use – were awaiting disbursement.

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<sup>3</sup> This term is frequently used to refer to the NTF Programme ‘project document’, dated 24 May 2006, which was provided to the evaluation team by IOM.



The NTF, however, was envisioned as being relatively short term, applied primarily to the NTF Programme and with neither governmental oversight nor advance deposits from donors. A preferable design would have conceptualised the NTF as a long-term institution intended to serve the entire Defence Reform process. Its management by the MOD, with oversight provided by NATO or a financial services firm, could have allowed for the building of additional on-the-job administrative capacity while also serving as evidence of the international community's faith in and long-term intention to support unified, national governmental institutions. Furthermore, the delays in the implementation of the NTF Programme could have served as an advantage had the NTF previously amassed donor contributions and earned a small amount of income through their cautious investment.

As is recommended in Section 6 of this report, the opportunity remains to correct some of these design flaws in NATO's trust fund model. The NTF, given its proven ability to attract donor funds, should be maintained and used, at least, to support the development of capacity among the MOD and personnel who will be involved in planning and implementing post-service transition ('reintegration') activities in the future. Furthermore, NATO should strongly consider extending the trust fund until, at least, the anticipated 2010 downsizing is complete (given the anticipated need for external assistance).

## **3.2 Programmatic Design**

The NTF Programme was a well designed intervention that allowed for a highly personalised approach to the reintegration of redundant personnel. That said, its design also reflects common omissions from 'conceptual' best practices, omissions which are prevalent in nearly every combatant reintegration programme implemented worldwide, that are highlighted within the literature. These are described here but may reflect the somewhat idealistic approach taken by scholars studying defence and security sector reform.

### ***3.2.1 Relevance, Flexibility & Beneficiary Ownership***

The NTF Programme was highly flexible and individualised. Beneficiaries were permitted to select from a wide range of options including agriculture, small business assistance ('self-employment'), job placement ('employment') and education, training or re-qualification. The sub-categories of assistance, furthermore, show that the actual number of possibilities is far more numerous. Not one of the 30 beneficiaries interviewed was able to provide an example of a type of assistance which he or she would have preferred but did not have the possibility to select.

The plethora of options allowed for individual reintegration project's to be developed based on the conditions of each beneficiary, thus fostering a high degree of relevance, responsiveness and beneficiary ownership.

### ***3.2.2 Design Flaws & Missed Opportunities***

Despite the strengths of its design, there exists room to develop the methodology utilised by IOM in BiH and beyond. Such improvements are further discussed below.

#### Verifiable Indicators

On one of the potentially most basic points, the evaluation team was surprised by the lack of objectively verifiable indicators within the Programme documents. Such an oversight is exceptionally surprising and complicates efforts at monitoring and evaluation. Furthermore, the lack of indicators reflects and leads to a lack of common purpose or definition of success. It is strongly suggested that the Local Steering Board (LSB) considers this question and develops, under the leadership of the MOD Transition Team, a series of indicators by which to conduct a final (and preferably external)



evaluation. These indicators may include: (i) stated increases in income relative to the pre-NTF period, (ii) value (and successful repayment) of loans pertaining to business expansion, (iii) knowledge of basic concepts pertaining to marketing and business planning, (iv) attitudes towards self-reliance and entrepreneurship (versus external dependency and lethargy) and (v) links with additional development projects, trade/agricultural associations or other service providers.

#### Support to Entrepreneurial Attitudes

The literature on development in post-communist countries and the provision of livelihoods for former military personnel has one striking feature in common: they both highlight the relative lack of entrepreneurial attitudes and understandings. As such, the failure to include a general ‘business training’ or ‘business planning’ session for all beneficiaries was surprising. Such an event, lasting between 1 and 2 days, could have helped to use exercises, activities and case studies in order to exemplify the sorts of approaches and attitudes needed to succeed in the business community, which one IOM staff member described as an ‘active or progressive spirit’. It could, also, have provided an opportunity for: (i) the development of additional joint projects or other forms of networks (i.e., cooperatives) among beneficiaries, (ii) the gathering of basic vulnerability data (‘financial criteria’) and verification of incorrect database information (particularly phone numbers and addresses) and (iii) the development of at least some rather routine business plans (to later be adapted and discussed during individual site visits).

The irony of this situation is that BiH presented a solid opportunity for such activities which, most commonly, are conducted in immediate post-conflict contexts in which they are less relevant. While generally of limited value in places such as Afghanistan or DR Congo, in which business planning and training is hindered by a lack of basic literacy and numeracy skills or overriding concerns regarding security or basic needs, redundant military personnel in BiH were both sufficiently educated and primarily concerned with the establishment of sustainable livelihoods.

#### Gender Strategy

The tendency to equate demobilisation with men and masculinity often results in an approach which does not consider adaptations necessary in the case of female beneficiaries. The tendency to sideline gender in security sector and defence reform is limited even further in countries, particularly former communist countries, in which gender inequity is perceived to be low. Such an exclusion is mistaken, as the inclusion of gender is done not solely to compensate for gender inequity but, in most cases, to ensure that gender variations in processes and approaches – such as transitioning to civilian life, business planning or managing an enterprise – are properly anticipated.


The NTF Programme would have been wise to include a gender strategy, a finding made by the evaluation team during the initial document review and, in particular, during the field work. The lack of a gender strategy or, more appropriately, an actionable series of guidelines for the provision of assistance to female beneficiaries resulted in social challenges discussed in Section 4 of this report.

#### Social & Political Reintegration

Equally surprising was the decision to exclude social and political reintegration from the Programme’s design. The triad of social, economic and political reintegration is widely discussed within the literature on former combatant demobilisation. Social reintegration may address serious psycho-social dilemmas such as war-trauma, post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), community re-acceptance and reconciliation or drug or alcohol abuse while political reintegration most commonly involves the exercise of political rights and, at times, the formation of political advocacy groups.




**Fig. 1. Three Potential Components of Demobilisation & Reintegration Programming**



In the course of the NTF Programme and in the context of BiH, standard applications of social or political reintegration may not necessarily apply. Social reintegration, if done forcibly and when not viewed as necessary, can be disempowering for a former fighter already marginalised by downsizing or demobilisation. In BiH, with the violent conflict having concluded nearly a dozen years prior and assistance for PTSD having previously been provided to the armed forces or demobilised combatants, standard social reintegration ‘packages’, such as that used by the World Bank’s EDRP in BiH, would not be appropriate for the NTF Programme. Similarly, the high degree of political organisation evident among veterans’ association in BiH would make the organisation of RP advocacy groups unnecessary and counter productive, particularly as veterans’ associations were already found to have successfully lobbied for benefits unaffordable for, at least, the entity government in the Federation.

Rather, this Programme provided an ideal opportunity to bolster the economic reintegration of beneficiaries through linkages with social and political reintegration – for instance, with socio-economic and politico-economic supports. Socio-economic reintegration could involve the formation of economic entities with covertly social agendas (i.e., the maintenance of the militaristic camaraderie which existed prior to discharge). Such organisations can range from ex-soldiers economic associations – based around the sharing of services and development of joint economic activities – to regular seminars or training (with a social component) focused around business planning, marketing, organic agriculture or other topics of wide interest and economic relevance.

**Fig. 2. Additional Sectors of Intervention for NTF Programme Design**



In the realm of politico-economic assistance, beneficiaries could be encouraged to take a leading role not in the advocacy for veterans but, rather, in advocating for appropriate policy changes pertaining to their businesses. Clear opportunities exist: (i) emphasising the need for short-term certification or accreditation programmes (to replace lengthy, exams-based training and re-qualification courses), (ii) pressing for more substantial subventions from the local municipality government or (iii) advocating in opposition to corruption among local authorities. Providing beneficiaries a leading role in such activities has a number of benefits. First, it allows them to re-gain their sense of self-importance and the identity of a communal ‘protector’ which is commonly lost during the post-service transition. Second, it allows critical issues to be pressed by individuals with a high degree of social authority and, according to recent survey data, broad popularity (though variations admittedly do exist). Third, it promotes democratic processes, attitudes and self-reliance which are intrinsically linked to capitalism and entrepreneurship. Fourth, it



may lead to improvements in the business environment and facilitate the economic growth of beneficiaries' enterprises.

### **3.2.3 Best Practices, Design**

The design also reflected several best practices which should be disseminated and replicated through IOM and other implementing agencies' programmes elsewhere in the world. Most notably, this includes the individualised design inherent within IOM's Information, Counselling and Referral Services (ICRS) methodology. A strong degree of attention is placed on the creation of a strong relationship between the implementing staff member and the beneficiary. In this case as in others, doing so was critical to providing beneficiaries with a sense of stability and support during a process – redundancy – which destabilising and which may result in feelings of isolation or atomisation. This 'best practice' was mainstreamed throughout implementation and even reflected in the manner in which procurement was organised, a factor discussed in Section 5 of this report.



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## 4. Impact

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The NTF Programme affected the institutional capacity of the Ministry of Defence as well as the economic and social positions of beneficiaries. All three impacts are discussed within this section.

### 4.1 Institutional Impact

While, as highlighted in the design section, the institutional impact was considered weak, it was also not intended to have been strengthened through the NTF Programme. As such, all improvements in the legitimacy and capacity of the MOD is 'above and beyond' what was formally required of IOM and, more broadly, the Programme.

#### 4.1.1 Capacity Building of State Structures

The MOD Transition Team was involved in a March 2008 regional seminar on resettlement activities. IOM was involved in this seminar, which was supported by various Lead Nations to the NTF Programme. Given that it was organised tangentially to rather than as part of the NTF Programme, its relevance to this evaluation is questionable. Regardless, its organisation represents a positive first step. Furthermore, the involvement of MOD personnel in IOM's NTF Programme staff meeting and lessons-learned seminar in June 2008 likely supported the development of capacities among the Transition Team, as does its sporadic involvement in monitoring activities. The provision of a greater role for the MOD in Local Steering Board (LSB) meetings, a recommendation made by the UK Defence Attaché, is also a step in the right direction. However, the decreased frequency of LSB meetings will mean that the MOD will only play a more prominent role in approximately three future LSB meetings.

Other public structures listed within Programme documents were rarely contacted concerning the NTF Programme. As such, no capacity development occurred.

#### 4.1.2 Legitimation of State Structures

The marginal role played by the MOD in this Programme also missed an opportunity to contribute to the legitimacy of State structures. Assistance, having been provided through IOM and in the name of NATO and the Lead Nations, did not lead to greater appreciation for or acceptance of the unified MOD. Given that MOD unification was a controversial and sensitive process, the NTF Programme should have attempted to give credit for the assistance provided to the MOD in order to signify its commitment to looking after individuals following their departure from the military or entity-level MODs.

#### 4.1.3 Remaining Institutional Needs & Opportunities

Given the relatively minor impact which the Programme has had upon the MOD and other governmental structures, capacity needs remain and may be addressed within the remainder of implementation and through future interventions. While it was not possible to undertake any analysis of the capacity needs of the MOD, Transition Team members indicated that they were most deeply interested in understanding the processes and procedures through which the NTF Programme was implemented. The evaluation team agrees that providing the Transition Team with a closer understanding of counselling, beneficiary needs assessments, procurement and distribution and, in general, participatory development is necessary.

Given that governmental entities are frequently adept at mass distribution and fairly un-nuanced approaches to welfare provision, it may be wise to emphasise, on an attitudinal and conceptual level, the value of individualised counselling and beneficiary-led reintegration processes. Transition Team members must, to provide an example, understand the difference between giving someone a tractor and assessing vulnerability,



discussing reintegration options, arriving upon a list of needs, prioritising those needs and procuring items locally and with the involvement of the recipient. That said, future government-led assistance to demobilised or discharged military personnel may be done with a relatively small staff. As such, IOM, NATO and the Lead Nations would be wise to avoid simply providing the NTF Programme as a model for replication. Rather, seminars should be held to develop a lower-cost form of assistance which can be implemented with a smaller staff while maintaining a similar level of individual attention. Doing so will undoubtedly require partnerships with municipal and entity-level public institutions and civil society. Given the resistance which all BiH governmental stakeholders exhibited towards intra-governmental cooperation, this are will also, undoubtedly, need to be addressed through future capacity development activities (within and beyond the scope of Defence Reform).

## 4.2 Economic Impact

The Programme had a definite economic impact and one which appeared to be sustainable and capable of ensuring multiplier effects. The size of economic gains, which tended to be somewhat small in most cases, could be greatly improved – along with sustainability – by additional funds being transferred for ‘sustainability initiatives’ and by providing IOM additional time with which to implement them. Put rather plainly, the economic impact has been ‘primed’, and the international community should not allow momentum to be lost when a far greater impact can be provided with only marginally more time and money.

### 4.2.1 Economic Benefits

Of the 30 beneficiaries visited and 93 surveyed, all but one demonstrated or anticipated some sort of socio-economic improvement as a result of NTF assistance. A further 32.6 per cent of survey respondents indicated that, following receipt of NTF assistance, they are ‘better off’ than when employed in the military or MOD, and 68.5 per cent indicated they were ‘better off’ than in the years – from 2004 to 2007, where applicable – following their termination from the military or MOD. While this latter statistic indicates that up to a third do not feel that NTF assistance had made them ‘better off’ relative to the livelihood they had established independently following demobilisation, this fact may be largely due to the fact that many, particularly those engaged in agriculture, had yet to see the economic benefits of NTF assistance.

In many cases it was difficult to ascertain the exact level of economic improvement given that assistance had been only recently received or that the economic benefits of education or training would only become apparent over the course of one to three years. One beneficiary, for instance, who had received scaffolding in the course of a self-employment expansion project anticipated that he would gain approximately 600 KM per year by renting the scaffolding to his employer. Given his monthly income of 600 KM, he anticipated his annual income increasing from 7,200 KM to 7,800 KM (or approximately 8.3 per cent). Yet, he remained hopeful that, during the next year, he would be able to rent his scaffolding more frequently and to additional construction companies, thus allowing him to earn an addition 1,000 to 2,000 KM per year. The total benefits remained impossible to quantify.

Increases are further complicated by the relative nature of gains. One former MOD official with extensive orchards of apples, plums and walnuts indicated that a savings of 1,000 KM would equal only a three per cent improvement in his annual income. A similar improvement in income (or cost savings) would be far more substantial and reflect a 20 per cent improvement for an RP earning approximately 5,000 KM per year from much more modest agricultural production.

IOM field staff, when asked to approximate the average increase in income they had witnessed or anticipated, indicated that five to 20 per cent was likely. Based on findings



of the field research, such numbers seemed appropriate. Of the 30 beneficiaries interviewed, 25 (83.3 per cent) indicated gains of three to 15 per cent, with an average of approximately eight per cent. The remaining beneficiaries indicated greater improvements which are discussed below in relation to the individual 'types' of assistance provided.

#### Self-Employment Expansion

Varied economic impacts were found among those selecting different types of assistance. Gains were most evident among those who had used assistance to expand an existing business, particularly those oriented around the provision of services. Such individuals generally received at least a 20 per cent improvement in profits. For instance, a barber in Nevesinje (Mostar AoR) who received a barber chair, a hairwashing station and scissors felt that he now received 20 to 30 per cent more clients – and a comparable increase in income – now that he was seen as operating a 'professional' salon. A similar trend was seen among a taxi driver in Trebinje (Mostar AoR) who felt that his new car – which was purchased with 2,000 KM from the NTF Programme and 5,000 KM of his own money – had brought him 30 per cent more customers and income.

It was difficult to determine whether or not similar benefits would accrue to those using income to expand retail businesses given that only one such enterprise was encountered during the field research. In this instance, the increased income of a small kiosk owner – where they sold candy, magazines and beverages – increased by only approximately five per cent.

#### Self-Employment Start-Up

Small business (or 'self-employment') start-up seemed to provide the least certain benefits. Of the six interviewed beneficiaries who had received this assistance, four were not able to use the items provided through the NTF Programme given that their intended business had not yet opened or that, in one case, it never would due to the weakness of the original business plan. This fact can be primarily attributed to the high costs of starting a small business and, in comparison, the relatively small amount of money available to beneficiaries. As such, individuals frequently requested items for a small-business start-up in hopes of using it in the coming one-to-two years once the business had opened. In the other two start-up projects viewed and beneficiaries interviewed, one should have been classified as a small business expansion (given that he had previously been operating the business for 8 years) and the other as employment (since the RP used the items for his employer rather than independently). As implementation continues and the final round of beneficiaries select livelihoods, those interested in starting a small business should be pressed to consider the viability of doing so. For those who have already received this form of assistance, supplemental assistance should be considered if an additional injection of funds would give them a needed 'kick start' allow them to begin generating income in the near future.

#### Agriculture

Agriculture beneficiaries, who were the most numerous, often seemed to receive relatively less substantial economic benefits. While many beneficiaries were reportedly able to expand of their farm once improved technology, particularly motocultivators, made is feasible, others were not. Those beneficiaries engaged in agriculture who were interviewed by the evaluation team often had limited access to land and, as such, were primarily constrained by this fact. One of the beneficiaries consulted in the Rajlovac AoR, however, indicated that his assistance – a motocultivator – would allow him to utilise all rather than half of the 4 hectares which he owned. In doing so, his on-farm income was doubled within a year. Such improvements were highly impressive. Concerns were also, however, sometimes raised concerning the effectiveness of motocultivators provided to beneficiaries with small plots of land or gardens. Such individuals frequently indicated



that they were able to save money by no longer renting a machine. While RAPPs often assumed that motocultivators would be rented to neighbours, beneficiaries frequently indicated that lending was done primarily without cost or in exchange for services (such as wood chopping, in one case).

Other forms of agricultural assistance were somewhat more reliably successful. Beekeeping produced a highly valued product which was in constant demand, according to the one apiculture beneficiary interviewed. Recipients of sheep, furthermore, were confident that their assistance would have long-term multiplier effects as offspring would emerge each year. Such interventions seemed particularly successful and sustainable.

#### Education, Training and Re-Qualification

The economic impact of education, training and re-qualification was less clear. Of the two education and training beneficiaries interviewed, one, in Prijedor (Banja Luka AoR), had a further three years of studies before graduating from college – the latter two years financed through his own income and savings – and the other, in Caplinja (Mostar AoR), would not finish for another year. While they both anticipated improved income, neither had letters of intent from anticipated employers.

#### Employment

Beneficiaries selecting the ‘employment’ option frequently fared the best of all. One, a high-tech automotive diagnostician in Banja Luka, nearly tripled his income after receiving a laptop. The computer allowed him to continue linking with the on-board computers of the Audis and Volkswagens at his employer’s shop, though it also allowed him to become a part-time ‘free agent’, taking his computer to other automotive garages in Bosnia, Croatia and Italy in order to use the latest technology to diagnose automotive difficulties for his clients. Using the Internet, he was even able to ‘remotely’ diagnose and address problems with customer’s on-board computers. From an average monthly income of 600-700 KM during the summer and little during the winter, he increased his monthly income to 2,500 KM during the summer and 1,000 KM other months of the year.

The level of success was similar among another beneficiary who had received a laptop in order to make sales presentations for the baked goods company at which he worked and in order to process sales information on-the-spot for customers. He was, thus, able to greatly increase his level of productivity and, on the basis of receiving the laptop, was able to negotiate a ‘permanent’ contract for himself with his employer. Though owing more to his abilities than to the laptop, he was soon thereafter promoted to the Director of Sales for the commercial bakery and earns a substantial salary (though one he did not wish to disclose). The third and final ‘employment’ recipient used the money to purchase a sewing machine and join his brother’s tailoring business. As a result, he was able to increase the small business’s profits by 30 per cent and begin, for the first time since leaving the military in 2004, earning a regular income.

#### **4.2.2 Sustainability**

The livelihoods supported through the Programme possessed a high degree of sustainability. In some cases this was due to the quality of the Programme while others had previously enabled sustainable livelihoods which were simply made more fully sustainable through NTF assistance. The Programme enhanced the sustainability of many beneficiaries’ livelihoods by improving their revenues, reducing their costs and/or permitting their expansion. Of the 93 surveyed beneficiaries, 89.1 per cent felt that they would still be engaged in their NTF-assisted livelihood five years into the future. Those who did not believe so – and who said that this was due to the lack of income from their livelihood as opposed to issues such as retirement – were all recipients of agricultural assistance. Though the number of agriculture beneficiaries indicating that they would leave their current livelihood was small, it does reflect a key challenge faced by those



engaged in this sector (and a challenge, unfortunately, linked closely with access to land, weather patterns and other issues more difficult for external assistance to address).

#### **4.2.3 Independent Beneficiary Contributions**

One of the most significant benefits of NTF assistance was the attainment of ‘multiplier effects’. Beneficiaries frequently, as a result of the availability of assistance – even if not deemed to be substantial – grew willing to contribute additional funds to improving their livelihood. The prevalence of beneficiary contributions, based on an analysis of data provided to the evaluation team, was 24 per cent in the Banja Luka AoR, 27 per cent in the Rajlovac AoR and 34 per cent in the Mostar AoR. Oftentimes these resulted from the high cost of items requested from IOM and the need to make substantial independent contributions. The average value of beneficiary contributions – among those who provided them – was approximately 580 KM (or 290 EUR).

At other times, beneficiaries independently decided to invest in the business after seeing the gains possible through relatively small investments. This was clearly true in the case of the aforementioned taxi driver whose decision to purchase a new car was based solely on the availability of NTF assistance – despite the fact that his contribution was 250 per cent as great. The highly successful laptop recipients previously highlighted were also driven to contribute additional funds for computer training, hardware, software and peripherals based primarily on the ‘priming the pump’ influence of NTF assistance. Both individuals, it must be noted, indicated that they would not have considered purchasing a laptop had it not been for the availability of NTF assistance.

#### **4.2.4 Challenges & Problem Areas**

Despite the overwhelmingly beneficial economic impact of the Programme, there were some areas in which benefits were deferred or complicated. In such instances, the assistance provided had resulted in unanticipated short-term economic challenges (despite the anticipation of long-term benefits).

##### Motocultivators

Initially, motocultivators were delivered to beneficiaries without the tires required by some, though not all, beneficiaries to transport the machinery to fields.<sup>4</sup> This fact resulted from the assumption, during procurement, that tires would be included. One beneficiary indicated that he had been ‘shocked’ by the lack of tires. IOM, upon recognising this problem, procured tires and distributed them to beneficiaries at no additional cost, thus avoiding any major challenge. This situation provides a solid testament to the quality of Programme management by the Executing Agency.

##### Greenhouses

Greenhouses pose a significant potential to increase the duration of the agricultural growing season and can allow for the same plot of land to be cultivated several times within a single season. However, the greenhouses provided, to the surprise of recipients and some IOM field-based staff, required extensive and technically onerous assembly. Materials for creating greenhouses – metal poles and nylon sheets – rather than assembled greenhouses were provided, and instructions for assembly consisted of one page rather than comprehensive directions and diagrams. As such, technical knowledge, the creation of foundations and the bending and welding of poles were required. The cost for doing so, if one did not have ready access to welding equipment and the requisite skills, could range from 500 to 1,000 KM and could necessitate significant

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<sup>4</sup> Tires were not required where the motocultivator could be stored in proximity to field or when beneficiaries possessed a trailer with which to transport it to the fields.



amounts of time.<sup>5</sup> Equally troubling was the attitudinal effect that this had upon greenhouse recipients. Many felt that their high hopes had been dashed. Others were required to borrow money in order to assemble the materials or to delay use of greenhouses until they were able to save sufficient funds.

This situation, like many, represents a problem of communication. While individuals within the Programme's procurement department and one IOM Field Office were aware that greenhouses would not be pre-fabricated, this fact was not adequately shared early in project implementation with two of the three Field Offices nor with beneficiaries in those regions. The problem of communication has, since, been addressed, and beneficiaries currently requesting greenhouses are told that assembly will be required. An alternative solution, providing pre-fabricated greenhouse, was examined and proved financially prohibitive.

#### **A Greenhouse Success Story**

Despite the problems involved in creating greenhouses, it was a greenhouse beneficiary who demonstrated one of the most creative business models encountered in the course of the evaluation. Mr Mico (last name withheld), who resides outside of Prijedor, received a greenhouse from IOM. Though 'shocked' that it did not come assembled, he reportedly borrowed more than 1,000 KM (500 EUR) from family members and friends in order to hire a welder and to buy materials for creating the foundation.

By his own initiative rather than with external assistance, Mr Mico began marketing his greenhouse produce to Bosnian 'foreigners', those who had left during the war and now come back only for several weeks or months during the summer. Visiting the houses of such 'foreigners', he advertises his produce and offers a home delivery service. As a result, Mr Mico receives regular orders and, indeed, cannot produce enough to keep pace. At other times, 'foreigners' visit his home in order to pick vegetables, particularly peppers, directly from his greenhouse or surrounding gardens.

This business, even with the greenhouse, brings in only 600 KM per year, though Mr Mico hopes to save enough money in order to expand in the future. Such expansion will, unfortunately, need to be delayed for at least another year as he continues to save money in order to repay the loans taken to fund the construction of the greenhouse.

Individuals such as Mr Mico should be used as models of entrepreneurship in order to spread similar values and creative approaches among other redundant personnel. Furthermore, such individuals deserve additional assistance, despite their level of success, in order to reward them for their ingenuity.

#### Sheep/Lamb Distribution

Beneficiaries who had requested sheep – generally 11 of them, 10 female and one male – were surprised to receive lambs less than six months old. These lambs were too young to reproduce and, thus, had to be raised for up to one year by beneficiaries prior to becoming profitable. This problem seems to have its roots in the administrative opacity surrounding this issue. In order to contain the spread of Brucellosis, it was forbidden to transport adult sheep (or lambs older than 6 months) within Bosnia and Herzegovina as of a 13 March 2008 regulation (though IOM received final clarification of this issue on 15 June 2008).<sup>6</sup> This fact was not and could not have been known to IOM staff nor to beneficiaries at the time of the site visits and, as such, the provision of lambs rather than

<sup>5</sup> It must be noted that the amount of money required for the assembly of greenhouses was based on beneficiaries' reports, and it seems likely that the figure may have been slightly exaggerated in order to elicit offers of compensation or additional assistance from IOM.

<sup>6</sup> Brucellosis is exceptionally uncommon and generally easily diagnosed among lambs younger than six months.



sheep remains a challenge but not one which the Executing Agency could have effectively surmounted. If anything, this point shows the importance of effective integration of all relevant public sector agencies into interventions.

The estimated cost of raising 11 lambs for one year – which primarily consists of feeding – was estimated by beneficiaries at between 240 KM and 360 KM, thus making the financial ramifications somewhat less severe than in the case of greenhouses.

#### Education, Training & Re-Qualification

As can be seen within the data, a substantial number of beneficiaries who initially indicated a preference for education later switched to an alternative form of assistance. When registering for assistance, 8.0 per cent had requested education, training or re-qualification, though, as of 31 July 2008, only 2 per cent had received it. The difference in numbers is partly due to the fact that agriculture, given its time sensitivity, had been prioritised during the first months of implementation. However, several beneficiaries indicated that they had changed their selection from education or training to agriculture, most commonly, after concerns arose about (i) financing the remaining years of education not supported by the NTF Programme or, most significantly, (ii) financing living costs during years of study.

No modification within this type of assistance was made in response to these challenges. It would, however, have seemed appropriate to propose a scheme whereby the NTF Programme provided a minimal stipend during years of study or, more realistically, provided tools in order to help them earn income while completing their studies.

### **4.3 Social Impact**

As noted in the previous section, social reintegration was not pursued through the NTF Programme despite occasional references in relevant documents to the social or socio-economic needs of redundant military personnel. That said, challenges related to social reintegration did exist, and beneficiaries did experience social effects resulting from the Programme.

#### ***4.3.1 Atomisation of Post-Military Life***

The literature concerning demobilised military personnel and other combatants indicates that the loss of camaraderie and a militarised culture forms a significant barrier to successful reintegration. This same dynamic was found to exist among the beneficiaries interviewed. One RP shopkeeper in Banja Luka, for instance, indicated that his present job was the first one at which he had been largely alone during the entire day, a comment echoed by other beneficiaries. For those dependent upon agriculture, it was more commonly framed as 'being at home all day'. While the preponderance of individuals made redundant in 2004 meant that beneficiaries had largely become accustomed to these situations, 2006/7 and future beneficiaries should be assisted in making this social transition.

Furthermore, this social transition – likely magnified by a loss of authority and institutional status – was also found, through surveys, to be relatively more prevalent among former military officers. While very few individuals indicated that they perceived themselves as being less respected following their departure from the military or MOD, 20.7 per cent of the overall survey sample indicated that they were now more respected. However, this figure was only 12.9 per cent among former officers (as opposed to 25.0 per cent among former soldiers and 23.8 per cent among former military and MOD civilians). They were also less likely – 25.8 per cent compared to 32.6 per cent – to feel 'better off' at present compared to when they were in the military. It, thus, seems likely that social reintegration may pose a greater challenge for former officers. However, the relatively small scale of this problem and the lack of authority that demobilised officers possess in contemporary Bosnia and Herzegovina, few security concerns are raised by



these statistics. Still, the use of former military personnel as advocates of social change and national unity – in essence, for peacebuilding – was proposed by another development professional in Sarajevo and could have merit as a form of public diplomacy if implemented genuinely.

'Networking' of livelihoods has the potential to promote social reintegration, challenge atomisation and provide positions of leadership which former officers could potentially fill. Examples of networking include associations, cooperatives and other forums for linking beneficiaries' livelihoods. These allow for social interaction and the creation of beneficial economic systems which, particularly in relation to agriculture, allow for economies of scale sufficient enough to enable processing and packaging or negotiation with large buyers such as grocery stores, wholesalers or exporters. Other forms of networking, such as networks which allow beneficiaries to offer discounted services or good to one another or pool equipment or expertise, are even less complex. Unfortunately, such functions were found, according to interviews with beneficiaries, to be rare among ex-soldiers' associations, though this fact creates an opportunity for the NTF Programme to fill the gap.

#### **4.3.2 Gender & Women's Empowerment**

Gender emerged as a significant concern during the field-based portion of the evaluation. Of the total, 337 (11.9 per cent) of total beneficiaries are female, and the sample included five women or 16.7 per cent of the 30 beneficiaries interviewed. While IOM field staff (both men and women) and within the Ministry of Defence did not feel that female beneficiaries merited a distinct strategy or proposed that the NTF Programme's flexible and individualised approach would allow for on-the-go adaptation to gender-specific needs if they existed. Such perceptions were found to be incorrect, and the lack of a specific gender strategy or female-specific implementation guidelines led to a limited and somewhat disempowering impact. These effects are described further below.

##### Coverture

This term refers to the use of a man, such as a husband or father, to stand in for a woman in the exercise of her rights. In this case, it applied decisively in two instances in which female beneficiaries' husbands became the de facto recipients of IOM assistance. In the first, a female beneficiary in Banja Luka had officially, according to documents, used her assistance to expand an internet café. In this instance, the woman's husband had started and managed the internet café and had, from the site visit through the selection and receipt of assistance, solely undertaken all interactions with IOM staff members. The woman had no information regarding the business, though she did tend the cash register for four hours during the evening. The woman still considered herself unemployed, openly lamented the loss of her position in the military and did not appear to be successfully reintegrated. Though she benefited from the income of the internet café, the RP had not developed any additional capacities through the process.

In the second case, the female RP in Laktasi (Banja Luka AoR) remained aware of the assistance, given that it was for an agricultural enterprise taking place not more than 20 metres from her home, though the effect was the same. The husband tended the agricultural production – pig breeding – and considered leaving his employment while making it clear – to the evaluation team during an interview – that, regardless of the income provided through the sale of pigs, his wife, the RP, would be expected to continue looking for short-term contract employment. Such situations may be less problematic than the first, as they show a female RP being at least more aware of the enterprise and marginally involved in the household finances. Indeed, it should be noted – as the MOD pointed out in comments on this report – that an emphasis on women's empowerment should not cause implementers to forego rational and promising livelihood opportunities. It is simply critical to ensure that, in cases in which a viable livelihood option is more strongly associated with a female beneficiary's male relative,



women are closely consulted in the design of the assistance package, consent to its content and will remain a partner in its management. Indeed, the use of reintegration assistance to foster family-wide businesses is an effective approach which allows for inter-generational transmission, the passing of skills within families and the successful social reintegration of the demobilised or redundant soldier/combatant into the family.

#### Other Concerns

Isolated incidents of additional problems were discovered and require attention to be avoided during the remaining period of implementation. The first deals with the imposition of assistance. One female RP in the Rajlovac AoR indicated that she had requested various types of agricultural machinery but been told, seemingly without cause, that they were unavailable. The IOM field staff, according to information provided by the RP, repeatedly recommended that she request 11 sheep, thus making her feel as if this was her one option despite not having previous experience with livestock (though shepherding was common in the area). The exact circumstances leading to this situation are unclear, though it highlights the importance of ensuring that female beneficiaries perceive themselves as having sufficient agency and authority in interactions with Programme staff to advocate for their own interests.

The final concern revolves around war widows who had been, as a sign of gratitude, provided a clerical or administrative role with little responsibility in either the entity-level MOD or, more commonly, the military. Such beneficiaries, who field staff described as forming a significant portion if not majority of female beneficiaries, often appeared to possess administrative competencies which they, in reality, did not or for which there was a limited market. One such RP with whom the evaluation team met had received a computer in order to operate a home-based bookkeeping business. She was not, however, able to do so and instead worked as a cleaner at a nearby coffee shop. This case, it should be noted, was the sole one in which no direct economic benefits could be reasonably expected to result from the assistance provided. Female beneficiaries who received assistance for home-based administrative or clerical businesses should be made a priority during future (non-IOM) monitoring and evaluations. If common challenges are found among this group, interventions for sustaining their reintegration should be developed in line with 'sustainability initiatives' or supplemental assistance schemes being considered in the framework of the NTF Programme. Alternatively, in order to enhance the credibility of the State-level MOD, the NTF could finance a small supplemental programme, to be implemented by the MOD (or by IOM in the name of the MOD) for war widows demobilised as a result of defence reform. Doing so could lend a strong degree of moral legitimacy to the nascent national structure.

#### **4.4 Best Practices, Economic & Social Impact**

Many of the best practices evident within this section are similar to those examined in the design section of this report. Beneficiaries, having been closely involved in the selection of assistance, were willing to provide substantial amounts of money for the purchase of economically-beneficial items. Such a methodology is not only applicable in relation to former soldier reintegration and economic development programming but also in relation to local governance and social fund activities whereby community contributions are sought.

Furthermore, the education assistance, while not ultimately selected by many beneficiaries, reflected best practices and interesting methods of payment which contributed to its effectiveness. Namely, payments for education were staggered over time in order to provide an inducement for beneficiaries to attend and perform adequately within the training and education courses. Doing so helps to overcome the challenge faced in out-sourced training activities whereby beneficiaries are not accountable to the supporting agency for their academic or technical performance.



Finally, it must be noted that the responsiveness demonstrated by IOM was also another best practice though one fully associated with implementation (covered in Section 5). Concerns regarding the provision of tires for motocultivators had been quickly addressed by present management. During the evaluation, a complaint was issued regarding the quality and health of bees provided to beneficiaries in a particular municipality. Within three days, IOM had organised a widespread review and survey of bee recipients to attempt to determine the scope of the problem and whether or not it was related to NTF-provided bees, a broader outbreak in the region or the bee supplier. The results and financial interests of various parties in the situation made it murky at best, though the swift and decisive action routinely taken by IOM Programme management sets a gold standard.



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## 5. Implementation

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The evaluation team became closely acquainted with the internal operating procedures of the Programme and with procedural components which contributed to its impact. These are addressed in this section alongside an analysis of the pace of implementation.

### 5.1 Phase One: Information, Registration & Profile Analysis

The first phase of the Programme aimed 'to clearly inform RP about the eligibility criteria and the necessary steps and timeline for participation in the Programme and that the Programme's main focus will be the most vulnerable groups' (Programme Document, p. 6). Initially planned for 1 September 2006, it was later delayed until 1 October 2006 and finally launched on 15 December 2006. This date was selected by IOM based on the information that the redundancy notification letters would be sent by 31 December 2006. When this deadline was not met by the BiH MOD, the information campaign was later re-launched in mid-April with the registration period having been set between 16 April 2007 and 31 May 2007.

These delays were highly disruptive, as was the lacking availability of the final lists of eligible beneficiaries, an issue which has only recently come close to being finalised. Furthermore, the MOD's failure to provide NTF registration documents to the beneficiaries within the barracks further undercut the information campaign. However, the evaluation team fully recognises that in-barracks information distribution or dissemination was purposely excluded from the Programme out of a desire to avoid creating undue levels of apprehension. Information campaigns within the barracks were particularly successful in previous interventions, such as IOM's TADS programme, given that demobilisation was voluntary rather than involuntary as in 2006/7.

#### 5.1.1 Municipality Meetings

The most effective means of communication and information dissemination was the one not anticipated at the outset of the Programme. Based on a recommendation from IOM's Field Office in Mostar, staff members implementing the NTF Programme organised meetings in each of the municipalities in which beneficiaries were located. This sort of adaptation is commendable and provides an example of a best practice which should be adopted by IOM in similar interventions elsewhere. These meetings provided an opportunity for IOM staff members to explain the Programme to beneficiaries and their family members (in many cases) as well as to local authorities. At the time of the evaluation, municipality meetings had been organised consistently from IOM's Field Offices in Mostar and Rajlovac, though implementation in the Banja Luka Area of Responsibility (AoR) seemed to have lagged, according to staff members in that Field Office, after initial meetings fell victim to poor planning and the involvement of too many stakeholders. In the Mostar and Rajlovac AoRs, slightly less than two-thirds of interviewed beneficiaries identified municipal meetings – advertised effectively by word of mouth and phone calls by IOM staff members – as their primary source of information regarding the NTF Programme.

As these meetings were not only an effective communication venue but also helped to liaise with local authorities and link beneficiaries with available (though rare) subventions offered by the municipal government, they should be implemented in those places in which they have not been. Beneficiaries who had received information regarding the Programme in municipality meetings often seemed the most content with the assistance received given that their expectations had been adequately managed. They were the least likely to have felt 'cheated' or to perceive inequitable treatment (though, like all, they had hoped to receive additional assistance).



### **5.1.2 The Media**

The second most effective means of communication was the media or, more specifically, television. Though the evaluation team had initially expected television, radio and the internet to be minimally important in terms of communication, nearly a third of beneficiaries first heard of the Programme from the media, particularly from television news stories. Clearly this route will prove critical in disseminating additional information related to this Programme of future Defence Reform activities in the future.

### **5.1.3 The Database & Beneficiary Profile Analysis**

Information gathered during registration was input into a database for use throughout the NTF Programme. This system proved effective and allows, thanks to IOM's highly skilled Database Manager, the rapid organisation and analysis of data. Most notably, this has become apparent within the beneficiary profile analysis which is updated on a monthly basis. This document allows readers to view several demographic trends among NTF Programme beneficiaries. The format and application of this document and of the database more broadly could be expanded. Data is commonly presented, in the *Database Analysis*, in terms of quantity rather than proportion. These numbers should also be provided in percentages, and the updated analyses of beneficiary profiles should reflect longitudinal developments in the profiles of people receiving assistance in the types of assistance they are selecting.

The data collected must be used more effectively. Detailed demographic data is particularly interesting but not particularly useful unless it is feeding into both implementation strategies and monitoring. What, for instance, does the age structure or proportion of single parents indicate about the types of livelihoods which may be most appropriate? How can an analysis of the options selected by single parents help field staff to recommend potential solutions to beneficiaries in a similar circumstance who are highly uncertain regarding what form of assistance to request (despite valiant counselling from IOM)? Or, how can the range of skills captured within the database be used to elucidate, for instance, the development of a network of RP-affiliated automotive garages around the country which engage in joint marketing, procurement and expertise-sharing? The database is exceptionally well organised and managed, though information is only as effective as its practical application.

Phase One of the NTF Programme was ultimately successful and overcame several obstacles presented by its fellow stakeholders. This flexibility and adaptability is impressive and set a positive basis for the onset of Programme activities.

## **5.2 Phase Two: Implementation of Programme Activities**

Like the first phase, Phase Two experienced a number of challenges which were successfully addressed. These challenges centred, most notably, around the perpetually incomplete nature of the lists of individuals to be made redundant. In this situation, IOM was unable to determine the amount of money which the NTF Programme would be able to provide. In such a case, consistency and the equitably provision of assistance was critical, and the evaluation team supports the decision to wait to begin implementation until the lists were in a relative final form (though a small number of 'pilot' cases with guarantees or safeguards<sup>7</sup> would have been preferred). Furthermore, the evaluation team recognises the logistical hurdles posed by the reliance upon the MOD. With a military and Ministry in transition, fulfilling these logistical duties provided a greater-

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<sup>7</sup> By safeguards, the evaluation team proposes, as is common in circumstances such as these, providing RPs with the option to serve as 'pilot' cases with assurances that, should Programme policies be modified in the future, they would receive no less than either the minimum or the average amount of assistance, in financial terms, provided.



than-anticipated challenge and made it difficult for IOM field-based staff members to implement the Programme as effectively as desired. The provision of two vehicles to each of IOM's three field offices has been completed, and IOM's recent decision to rent an additional vehicle for each field office in July/August 2008 has allowed implementation to progress with minimal logistical limitations.

Such logistical hurdles, it should be noted, seems to have emerged from two separate problems: the lack of specificity and strained communication. First, initial Programme documents did not seem – according to those seen by the evaluation team – to indicate the number or quality of cars to be provided. Nor was a deadline for the delivery of vehicles – or for the establishment and outfitting of field offices – set. This lack of clarity created room for confusion and uneven expectations. Second, communication regarding logistics – even as evident in interim reports and other documents – appears at times hostile and unnecessarily confrontational. Given that, for instance, the December 2007 visit of NATO personnel from Brussels representing the Lead Nations resulted in the rapid appointment of MOD Points of Contact (PoCs) and resolution of logistical disagreements, one viable strategy would have been to enlist high-level support earlier in order to ensure faster progress (not only in regards to logistics but also with reference to the legal process impeding finalisation of the lists of personnel to be made redundant).

Regardless of the strategies employed, the focus of the Programme and of the evaluation is largely upon the beneficiaries. For them, implementation revolved around the process through which they registered for, selected and received assistance. This process and its strengths and weaknesses are identified below.

### **5.2.1 Site Visits, Counselling & Technical Assistance**

Once implementation began following the Phase One information campaign, site visits were scheduled. Site visits involve a one-on-one interaction between an RP and an IOM field staff member. During these interactions, IOM staff members updated 'financial criteria' sheets in order to determine the individual's vulnerability-linked eligibility amount and, most notably, attempted to determine which form of assistance would be most economically beneficial given his or her circumstances. This 'counselling' was a critical part of the Programme.

#### Site Visits

Site visits and counselling were found to have been implemented with the vast majority of beneficiaries. Education/training beneficiaries, it seems, had frequently not received site visits given that, as with agriculture beneficiaries, their form of assistance was not linked to a plot of land or other belongings. No physical verification was necessary. However, personal discussions were key in order to ensure that beneficiaries requesting education or training had selected the most appropriate form of assistance and were aware of the other opportunities available to them. In such cases, the evaluation team that site visits should be conducted. The second concern was raised with regard to beneficiaries who had not received any in-person interaction with an IOM staff member. Three such cases, out of the 11 beneficiaries interviewed, were found in the Banja Luka AoR. An additional case was found in Trebinje, in the Mostar AoR, though the same qualification applies to this finding. Such situations should be avoided, and NTF Programme management is advised to establish a mechanism for ensuring that site visits do occur at all times.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> IOM has reviewed the case files of the beneficiaries interviewed by the evaluation team and indicated that beneficiaries excluding those engaged in the education/training option had received site visits (with one case still pending). This matter remains unresolved, and it remains possible (though somewhat unlikely in the opinion of the evaluation team) that some beneficiaries had forgotten their site visits or had not understood the question when asked, through a translator, about the occurrence of site visits by the interviewer.



### Counselling & Technical Assistance

The broader issue pertaining to site visits concerns the degree of technical assistance. Counselling can, at minimum, act as a form of discussion whereby the IOM Programme Assistant or Team Leader attempts to logically determine, with a beneficiary, what form of assistance is most appropriate given an individual's personal and familial situation and apparent skills and resources. At most, counselling could be a form of horticultural, veterinary and entrepreneurial advising and training. In this case, the situation fell between these two poles but far closer to the former. IOM staff members were backed up by technical experts – either agricultural or business consultants – who reviewed beneficiaries' proposed reintegration projects (or RAPPs) prior to submission to the Team Leader or Programme Manager. It was the perception of the evaluation team that the consultants' skills were underutilised and that they functioned in the same manner as Programme Assistants while routinely answering brief questions about the market value of particular agricultural products or about specific items requested by beneficiaries. While the degree of counselling and technical advising is reportedly higher, according to the IOM personnel, this fact was not discernible. It must be noted, however, that only one of IOM's three long-time consultants was available for interview during the evaluation and that perspectives on their role was generally provided by their colleagues (who may not fully appreciate the roles they fill).

#### **A Note on 'Hard' Cases**

IOM implementing staff members frequently discussed the specific counselling needs of 'hard' cases, those in which beneficiaries seemed 'lost' and unable to conceptualise any post-military livelihood for which they wanted assistance. In the Mostar and Rajlovac Areas of Responsibility (AoRs), these were wisely joined with a specific approach consisting of the following: (i) staff meetings to discuss the case and identify recommendations, (ii) the organisation of meetings between indecisive beneficiaries and already-assisted beneficiaries and (iii) the rotation of staff members dealing with particularly 'hard', frustrating or emotional cases in order to bring a fresh approach and perspective. This approach should be applauded and provides a best practice replicable elsewhere in the world.

#### **5.2.2 RAPP Development & Approval**

Following several days of site visits, IOM field staff would begin developing Reintegration Assistance Project Proposals (RAPPs) for each beneficiary with whom they had spoken. A RAPP, the format for which changed several times during implementation (see 5.3.1), included information pertaining to the beneficiary, a description of the assistance which he or she had requested, a short statement regarding the usefulness of this assistance (generally written by an agriculture or business consultant) and financial analysis of the anticipated improvements which a beneficiary could anticipate based on NTF assistance.

These documents were highly useful and remarkably individualised. They provide a two-to-three-page biography and business plan for each beneficiary. Unfortunately these documents were developed by the IOM field staff in English and not seen, in a local language, by the beneficiary (though one IOM staff member indicated that he orally translated the document for each beneficiary). English-only RAPPs were the only Programme component which lessened beneficiary ownership. Furthermore, many IOM field staff members indicated that RAPPs, if in the local language, could facilitate beneficiaries' access to micro-credit. A lack of human resources among the Executing Agency prevented such translations from being produced, though it is advised that resources should be made available to translate all RAPPs into the local language and send them to the beneficiaries prior to the completion of the Programme. Given the lack of staff resources, these should likely be contracted to an external firm. (IOM staff




members estimated that at least two-to-three months of full-time translation work by all IOM NTF Programme staff members would be required to translate the estimated 7,000 pages of RAPPs which will be created by the end of implementation.)

### RAPP Approval

Based on statistics requested<sup>9</sup> from IOM Sarajevo's Database Manager by the evaluation team, the average time elapsed between the submission of a RAPP to the Programme Manager and its approval is 21 days (three weeks). The median number of days is 17, thus suggesting that the average is adversely influenced by a small number of outliers. These figures, however, may be misleading given that RAPPs go through an approval process within each of the Field Offices before being submitted to the Programme Manager for approval. The total process which a RAPP undergoes is portrayed below.

**Fig. 3.** The RAPP Approval Process



The initial and wisely short-lived practice of requiring the IOM Chief of Mission's (CoM) approval for each individual RAPP was discontinued. The RAPP approval process works efficiently, though expedited procedures for approving commonly requested items or providing assistance for existing businesses should be considered. An analysis of those RAPPs which are rarely returned for additional counselling or revision would help to identify those which could be fast-tracked.

**Table 2.** Time Elapsed within the RAPP Approval, Procurement and Delivery Processes

Category	Submission to Approval (days)	Approval to Delivery (days)	Mean for Submission to Delivery (days)	Median for Submission to Delivery (days)
Agricultural <sup>10</sup>	17	94	111	95
Self Employment - Start Up	32	72	104	84
Self Employment – Expansion	32	73	105	84
Employment	18	53	71	62
Education	11	43	54	37

<sup>9</sup> IOM is advised to consistently gather and monitor statistics such as these related to internal operational performance and effectiveness.

<sup>10</sup> It is important to note that delivery times for certain forms of agricultural assistance – livestock and bees – were not delayed but rather postponed until the appropriate season for delivery. As such, a beneficiary whose request for bees was approved in October 2007 may have had to wait until May through July until the weather was appropriate for delivery. In such cases, delays are in fact not delays but are necessary postponements. The time for procurement of agricultural assistance may be artificially increased by this fact.



<b>Mean</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>86</b>	<b>107</b>
<b>Median</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>59</b>	<b>84</b>

*\*Note: The durations given here include those cases which are not approved during their first review, thus implying that most cases involve fewer days than listed on the table above*

As can be seen the median times for submission to delivery are less than the mean time, again highlighting the influence of a small number of outliers on the averages. Clearly, however, the procurement process, following the approval of a RAPP, takes a far more significant period of time.

### **5.2.3 Procurement**

The time required for procurement was rather lengthy and often resulted in IOM field staff and Procurement Assistants spending significant amounts of time responding to beneficiaries' queries regarding the anticipated date of delivery. While the evaluation team was unable to gain a full understanding of IOM's global procurement guidelines, it seems that opportunities had been missed. In many cases, estimated between 60 and 90 per cent, beneficiaries had identified the items they had wished to receive upon learning, generally through municipality meetings, the financial range which was possible (2,400 to 3,200 KM depending on vulnerability levels). As such, a survey of beneficiaries could have allowed IOM to determine the major items that were desired and in what proportions. Such statistics, which could have been gathered through a telephone survey or a brief post-municipality meeting consultation, could have allowed IOM to procure items in advance. If, for instance, it seemed likely that 400 beneficiaries would be requesting a certain type of motocultivator, a smaller number (say 60 per cent or 240) motocultivators could have been procured and ready for distribution immediately following the approval of a RAPP. The counselling process under such an arrangement would continue as planned, and beneficiaries who had earlier requested an item would be permitted to change their minds through discussions with IOM staff members during the site visits. Doing so would limit beneficiary involvement in procurement – with beneficiaries being asked to commonly obtain three quotations – but would have been a logical response to the delays in implementation forced by the late arrival of beneficiary lists from the MOD. As a rule, it seems as if strict adherence to a strong methodology, while admirable, may have prevented modifications necessitated by the challenging circumstances (i.e., timeline and logistics) of implementation.<sup>11</sup>

#### Cost Increases

One of the most significant factors pertaining to procurement was the repeated increase in the cost of items commonly requested by beneficiaries. In several cases, an item requested would increase fairly substantially in price from the time at which it was requested (during the site visit) and the time it was procured. The increase in cost was generally shared by IOM and the beneficiary, who would be asked to make a larger contribution if the item's total cost significantly exceeded his or her eligibility amount.

Cost increases resulted from a variety of logical factors and did not, however, seem to constitute price gouging. Fuel costs increased transportation costs for items imported into BiH, and livestock were particularly vulnerable to fluctuations in global food prices. That said, a proportion of price increases could have been avoided by either (i) procuring items (though not necessarily livestock) in bulk, as previously suggested, before their purchase had been approved through the RAPP development process or (ii) mandating

<sup>11</sup> While doing so would have influenced the level of counseling, it would not have rendered changes in assistance requests impossible. By purchasing only a fraction of the total requested, the Executing Agency would have in-stock sufficient items for those who had requested them without beneficiary 'mind changes' cause financial waste or over-procurement.



that prices given within bids were honoured by suppliers for a longer duration, generally at least one year. In regards to the second point, the following 'terms of validity' were linked to different items:

- Beehives: 2 years
- Heifers: 2 months
- Tools: 1 year
- Tractors: 0 months (no terms of validity beyond review of bids)

Tractor attachments, it should be noted, had no term of validity (beyond the review of bids) during the first procurement, though a longer term of validity was later pursued and achieved. As a result of the commonly short 'terms of validity', suppliers who had won contracts to deliver items were free to modify their prices at will, though IOM maintained the right to consider alternative suppliers in such cases. This degree of flexibility is, in the evaluators' experience, uncommon, and far lengthier 'terms of validity' should have been negotiated by leveraging IOM's role as a major customer.

#### Delivery

The delivery of items to beneficiaries posed an additional challenge. While beneficiaries were commonly pleased with the delivery times, they also indicated that arrangements proved confusing. Beneficiaries expecting home delivery were frequently asked to pick up items from suppliers, sometimes requiring significant and unanticipated transportation costs. This situation resulted from the 'informal' nature of the delivery arrangements. Tenders requested that interested suppliers submit quotes for pick-up rather than delivery. Successful suppliers were then asked to agree to deliver items to municipal centres (or other central locations) for beneficiaries to collect them. Suppliers commonly agreed to deliver items to municipalities at no additional cost, and beneficiaries were told that delivery to the municipal centre was guaranteed (or at least to be expected). However, rising fuel prices and suppliers' discomfort at absorbing substantial transportation costs often led them to back out from this agreement. Several beneficiaries reported being contacted by suppliers and told a variation of the following: 'If you would like to receive your item this week, please come and pick it up from the warehouse. If you prefer to wait for delivery to your municipality, I will be there in 3 or maybe 4 weeks.' Unwilling or unable to wait additional weeks for long-anticipated items, beneficiaries frequently agreed to pick up and transport items.

### **5.3 Executing Agency Policies & Procedures**

One major area of concern involved the internal policies and procedures of the Executing Agency. While, at the time of the evaluation, Programme management was found to be excellent, perceptive and responsive, earlier management appears to have taken steps detrimental to the pace and quality of implementation.

#### **5.3.1 Implementation Tools (Documents, Templates, etc.)**

IOM currently uses a wide range of standard documents to manage information flow, internal communications and the design of individual beneficiary assistance packages (or 'projects'). These include:

- A Reintegration Assistance Project Plan (RAPP)
- Financial Criteria (or 'Vulnerability Assessment')
- An Agricultural Site Visit Template
- A Business Analysis Sheet



These documents were found, overall, to be well designed and effective, and no modifications in the documents themselves are recommended at this point in time. Rather, it is critical to note that such tools should have been finalised prior to the onset of Programme implementation.

According to a review of the documents, four different RAPP formats were noted (though more recent modifications were exceptionally minor). Similarly, it was apparent that the Financial Criteria sheet, perhaps the most important document given that it indicates a beneficiary's eligibility amount, had gone through at least one major revision. The Business Analysis Sheet was also found to have been modified over the course of implementation by the Programme Manager and a business consultant.

While mid-Programme modifications in implementation are, at times, critical, they are to be avoided when not. Within the NTF Programme, frequent changes of documents, templates and policies created the following concerns among the evaluation team:

- Field-based staff members indicated confusion regarding the policies to be utilised once implementation began. Such uncertainty slowed the initial pace of implementation and weakened the morale of implementing staff.
- Changes in the Financial Criteria resulted in different levels of assistance for beneficiaries with similar levels of vulnerability not based on their needs but based on when IOM had contacted them. This meant that beneficiaries assisted first were often provided less assistance than those assisted later in the Programme. This fact also undermines IOM's critical methodological aim for levels of assistance to fluctuate solely based on beneficiary vulnerability.

The Programme should have been conducted with a single set of tools and implementation guidelines from the outset. At the time of the evaluation, the NTF Programme still lacked an implementation guide or manual for use by field staff. The time to create such a document certainly existed given the MOD-related days in implementation, thus presenting an opportune period in which to develop tools with the close involvement of field staff and field-test them with a small number of beneficiaries. For an organisation as experienced as IOM, this oversight is striking and should be avoided within the future.

#### **5.4 Best Practices, Implementation**

While several concerns were raised regarding implementation, several best practices were also evident. First, the high degree of beneficiary ownership was demonstrated far beyond basic 'participatory' methods. Procurement, in particular, was wise to include beneficiaries and, indeed, to be led by them. In identifying suppliers, comparing prices, locations and levels of service, beneficiaries were certain to feel a strong degree of ownership over the items they delayed.

Furthermore, while delivery issues were raised, a promising practice was also introduced whereby suppliers were selected – even if slightly more expensive – in close proximity to beneficiaries. As such, less distance was required for distribution and, most importantly when dealing with technical items such as machinery or computers, for seeking maintenance and service in the event of a challenge. Each of the machinery or computer recipients interviewed in the course of this evaluation were able to clearly explain the terms of their warranty and the location at which they would receive service in the event of technical problems. Such a fact was impressive, and this achievement is a clear best practice.

Finally, as previously indicated, the use of municipality meetings is something not uncommon in reconstruction and development work but was done particularly well and seemed an excellent venue for providing clear information and reducing rumours or confusion among beneficiaries. It is to be commended.



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## 6. Recommendations

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Numerous recommendations pertaining to future programmes have been made within this report. This section attempts to identify the most critical of those and, in particular, to identify key modifications which can support the remainder of Programme implementation and follow-up.

### 6.1 Prior to the End of the Programme

The opportunity remains to broaden and deepen the impact of the NTF Programme prior to its completion. Several recommendations for doing so are made below.

#### 6.1.1 *Increase the Speed of Implementation*

The rate of implementation was a major issue discussed between the evaluation team and IOM staff members. While targets to process 160 RPs per month should enable timely completion of the Programme by the end of March 2009, this would not allow for time to follow-up beneficiaries through monitoring, to engage in additional MOD capacity building or to address concerns raised within this evaluation. Additional time will be necessary, and both IOM and the Lead Nations can take steps in order to ensure that it is available.

##### Change Internal Monitoring Procedures

According to reports from IOM field staff members, monitoring which began in May 2008 has reduced their rate of implementation by between 30 and 50 per cent (a statistic which is disputed by Programme management). While monitoring was wisely initiated and highlighted some major issues which IOM was, thus, able to quickly resolve in relation to agriculture assistance, its short-term benefits may have already been fully realised. Furthermore, the desire to engage in rapid monitoring – with each monitoring form necessitating only five to 10 minutes<sup>12</sup> in order to be completed – has prevented a more in-depth approach.

Three options exist for improving monitoring. First, monitoring could be stopped until implementation is nearly or fully complete and later resume with a more comprehensive approach which attempts to gauge financial increases, basic business skills and entrepreneurial attitudes, integration with associations and municipality support systems, registration, taxation and remaining needs. Second, and most preferable in the opinion of the evaluation team, Programme beneficiaries within each municipality could be hired, trained and paid to conduct evaluations of RPs within their areas. Such a procedure would allow monitoring to continue while providing needed, albeit relatively minor and short-term assistance to less successful beneficiaries. Third, local NGOs could be hired in order to engage in monitoring, perhaps while simultaneously engaging, if sufficient personnel exists, in ‘sustainability initiatives’. Such steps would contradict IOM’s internal policy of establishing trust through its Information, Counselling and Referral Services (ICRS) activities for former soldiers. However, it is believed that the passing of the proximate post-conflict phase and the prevalence of trust makes continued contact between a single beneficiary and a single IOM staff member to be ideal but far from necessary.

##### Simplify RAPP Development & Approval Procedures

RAPPs, the documents which describe the conditions of and assistance to be provided to each beneficiary, are highly individualised but may be streamlined in the interest of

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<sup>12</sup> Here it is important to note that while monitoring itself is a rapid process, traveling to the beneficiaries’ homes takes a great deal of time as does locating and viewing the assistance received and fulfilling social expectations of politeness.



implementation. For example, a review of RAPPs for beneficiaries interviewed showed that most projections of financial benefits resulting from NTF assistance were frequently inaccurate due to the changing economic context (particularly in relation to agriculture). Such a component, while important, may be best saved until later in the Programme – during final internal monitoring – once actual financial benefits may be known or, at least, better estimated.

Furthermore, the final approval of RAPPs should be shared between the Programme Manager, the Assistant Programme Manager and, if possible, the newly hired Business Advisor.

#### Avoid Internal Policy Changes

Alterations to IOM operating policies and procedures can slow the pace of implementation and should be avoided except in key areas of concern highlighted in section 6.1.3.

#### Pre-Purchase Commonly Requested Items

The delivery of assistance is one of the most time-consuming aspects of implementation. Even if, as is planned, all RAPPs have been written and approved by the Programme's current end date on 31 March 2009, between three and five months, according to best estimates, would still be required before all items are delivered to beneficiaries. This fact seems unacceptable for contractual and administrative reasons.

As such, beneficiaries who have yet to receive a site visit or who have delayed the selection of assistance should be contacted by telephone and asked if they are, at the time of the call, prepared to identify the specific item they would like to obtain. If the beneficiary is able to identify a particular item, he or she should be informed that their selection is binding and that they are now required to obtain pro-forma documents such as land ownership certificates, discharge letters and proof of disability. For items included within the NTF Programme's 'Price List' or 'BEAC<sup>13</sup> List' of commonly procured items – for which a supplier has already been identified – procurement could start immediately. If an item is more specialised or is likely to require maintenance and support (such as a computer), the beneficiary should be instructed to gather quotations from local suppliers within a certain timeframe. This final point, the need to set strict timelines on beneficiaries, is important in ensuring that, as continues to happen, beneficiaries do not themselves be allowed to cause delays by failing to get remaining documents. IOM would be wise, in this regard, to set strict deadlines for the receipt of all documentation required from beneficiaries.

For those beneficiaries who are able to identify the item they intend to request during a phone call, the full RAPP should be developed at a later date but, to the degree possible, prior to the delivery of the item.

#### **6.1.2 Promote Sustainability & Impact**

The Programme, as has been indicated, has resulted in or supported sustainable livelihoods. However, sustainability and, more to the point, economic impact should be and can be improved with only a small amount of additional assistance.

#### Expand Sustainability Initiatives

The 'sustainability initiatives' (or sub-grants) conceptualised by IOM and approved by the Lead Nations are a wise step and have the potential to have a significant impact upon beneficiaries. However, the small amount of money – 100,000 EUR – dedicated to them and the limited time frame available is of concern. The Lead Nations and IOM should

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<sup>13</sup> This acronym is an internal one used by IOM. It stands for Bids Evaluation and Awards Committee.



consider the financial viability of increasing the amount of money available for 'sustainability initiatives', whether this requires reallocation within the existing budget and/or the insertion of additional funding.

Furthermore, as the proposed and highly effective 'sustainability initiatives' include key items such as agricultural cooperative/association formation which often require a full year to be implemented, one of two options should be considered: (i) an extension of the Programme until, at least, October 2009 or (ii) approval for the implementation of 'sustainability initiatives' to continue until the end of 2009. The second options seems more viable and should be accompanied by the maintenance of at least one IOM staff member in each Area of Responsibility (AoR) in order to supervise implementation and to facilitate close MOD involvement as an experiential form of capacity development.

#### Consider 'Jump Start' Assistance for SME Start-Ups

As noted, few beneficiaries who had selected to receive assistance under the 'self-employment start-up' heading had started businesses at the time of the evaluation. This problem is a critical one, and the possibility remains that few will be able to do so within the timeframe of the Programme.

An evaluation of individuals receiving 'self-employment start-up' assistance should be conducted, and those who appear likely to open with a small injection of additional funds should receive further assistance. The purpose of such an evaluation should not be disclosed to the beneficiaries, and the amount available should be permitted to fluctuate within budgetary constraints (rather than, as is being considered, requiring an average level of assistance of 350 KM, which is too low to have a significant impact).

### **6.1.3 Review Assistance & Rectify Problems in Areas of Concern**

Areas of concern highlighted by the evaluation should be re-viewed and addressed.

#### Gender

A review of assistance provided to female beneficiaries should be quickly undertaken. Assuming that the issues raised within this evaluation are corroborated, potential solutions should be considered. First, guidelines regarding gender should be developed. These ought to include, at minimum, the need to: (i) interact primarily if not solely with female beneficiaries rather than through their male relatives, (ii) to adopt a highly participatory approach and to moderate one's tone or attitude when dealing with female beneficiaries, (iii) to involve female staff members in the site visits of female beneficiaries, where applicable, and (iv) to seek evidence – through letters of intent or meetings with potential customers – that businesses or employment opportunities suggested by women are viable. Ideally this last recommendation would apply to all beneficiaries, though it may be particularly applicable to women given the fact that, in cases observed by the evaluation team, female beneficiaries may have attempted to exaggerate opportunities available in order to please IOM staff members.

#### Greenhouses

Simply put, the cost incurred by greenhouse beneficiaries in the Rajlovac and Banja Luka AoRs were not acceptable. As such expenses resulted from an internal communication failure among IOM staff members, IOM should be accountable for rectifying the negative financial implications this may have had. The reasonable cost of constructing a greenhouse should be assessed, and this amount should be paid to those beneficiaries who paid this amount independently (often through taking out loans). For those who have yet to construct greenhouses, RPs engaged in metalworking or who possess technical skills should be hired by IOM to complete the construction of the greenhouses, installation of sprinkler systems and other necessary tasks.

### **6.1.4 Increase Governmental Capacity Building**



While not a formal objective of the NTF Programme, simple steps can be taken in order to build the MOD's capacity during the remainder of implementation. These recommendations should be understood as supplementing rather than replacing the workshops and focused capacity development activities already wisely planned by the MOD Transition Team with the support of the Lead Nations.

#### Maintain/Increase Frequency of LSB Meetings

The new role of the MOD Transition Team in Local Steering Board (LSB) meetings is a promising step. In order to ensure that it is also meaningful, LSB meetings should be organised each month or every other month. Furthermore, LSB meetings should be hosted within the MOD, and the minutes should be produced in or translated into the local language.<sup>14</sup> At each meeting, the MOD should be requested to gather additional information regarding the NTF Programme and present it at the following meeting. This would require the MOD to, for instance, engage in increased monitoring, to plan an evaluation of the NTF Programme, to conduct and report the results of that evaluation and to improve intra-governmental cooperation (see Section 6.1.4).

#### Plan a Final Evaluation with Transition Team Involvement

The MOD Transition Team should be given responsibility for overseeing a final evaluation of the NTF Programme. The Transition Team should be responsible for developing the TORs, selecting a firm to conduct the evaluation and participating on a day-to-day basis in the fieldwork. The selected firm, furthermore, should be expected to provide capacity building to the MOD Transition Team, and other relevant governmental stakeholders, on the development of evaluation methodologies and tools. Sufficient resources should be dedicated to this evaluation in order to allow broad coverage, lengthy field time, full independence from the Executing Agency and the aforementioned capacity development activities.

#### Develop an NTF Programme Implementation Manual

The absence of a set of strict policies and procedures for implementing the NTF Programme was a bit surprising. The lack of such a document, in addition to resulting in variations in implementation across the various AoRs, also made it relatively difficult to share procedures with stakeholders, particularly the MOD Transition Team. As such, the Transition Team and other institutional stakeholders possessed misconceptions regarding NTF implementation and the policies governing the Programme.

While likely too late to be of use in the remainder of the Programme, a detailed Implementation Manual should be created and translated into the local language. Upon its completion, and towards the culmination of the Programme, this Manual should be reviewed with the MOD and revised with its input. While likely a time-consuming process, an extended workshop or series of seminars should be arranged in order to turn an IOM-created Implementation Manual into a set of initial guidelines for future MOD post-service transition activities.

#### Foster On-the-Job Training

While it may not be possible, the original idea of situating MOD personnel within the Field Offices should be re-visited. On either a temporary or a full-time basis, if sufficient personnel and stability exists, the MOD should assign individuals to work alongside IOM Programme Assistants. In the process, they would gain significant capacity and, most importantly, an understanding of participatory development which, regardless of valiant efforts, cannot be adequately conveyed within a manual. If MOD personnel cannot be assigned to IOM Field Offices on a permanent basis, Transition Team members may wish

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<sup>14</sup> The evaluation team was rather surprised to find that MOD Transition Team members had not once been able to receive the notes of meetings in which they participated.



to consider one-week 'shadowing' visits (which should involve their participation in 'participatory' activities such as municipality meetings and site visits, in particular, rather than in more passive or didactic monitoring).

### **6.1.5 Build Bridges with Relevant Public Sector Entities**

Governmental institutions contacted as part of this evaluation frequently seemed relatively unaware of the Programme. Given the atomisation of these institutions and the lack of intra-governmental cooperation which they noted, this fact is understandable. However, it will also remain necessary to ensure that, in support of future MOD-led post-service transition activities, all relevant stakeholders are incorporated.

#### Seminar on Intra-Governmental Cooperation

As part of the aforementioned MOD-led development of post-service transition guidelines, a seminar on intra-governmental cooperation should be held. Employment Institutes at both the entity and municipal levels should be included, as should representatives of the entity-level ministries of agriculture and labour and the national Ministry of Civil Affairs. This seminar, which will require additional support from international donors, should not only identify areas for collaboration but should also result in the following: (i) a 'handbook' of governmental services for redundant and other discharged military and MOD personnel and (ii) the establishment of an ombudsman's office within the MOD to facilitate the access to necessary and available services. International financial support for the establishment, training and operations of this ombudsman's office will almost certainly be required.

### **6.1.6 Maintain & Strengthen the NATO/PfP Trust Fund**

Given that the NATO/PfP Trust Fund has won support from numerous donor governments, it should be maintained as a mechanism to foster the development of governmental capacity in relation to post-service transition (i.e., for such programmes as are currently being considered for funding by the Norwegian and UK governments). Furthermore, it may prove necessary in the event that international assistance is requested to assist in future military downsizing anticipated in 2010.

However, the design of the NTF should be modified in order to align it with international best practices for multi-donor trust funds. Funds should be deposited within the fund in advance of their allocation, and they should be invested in order to earn additional income in advance of their use. The Ministry of Finance or, more plausibly, the Ministry of Defence should – with approval and ultimate oversight of the Parliamentary Assembly – be put in charge of the trust fund.

## **6.2 For Future Programmes**

Future assistance for redundant personnel should be better designed and account for challenges faced during the implementation of the NTF Programme. More specifically, it should address the following areas:

- Governmental capacity building should be included as a primary objective, and associated activities should be included.
- The inclusion of all relevant governmental bodies should be thoroughly considered, pursued and tracked. Governmental institutions, particularly municipalities, should, furthermore, be considered as implementing partners given their geographical dispersal and inclusion of technical experts.
- A detailed Implementation Manual should be developed in advance of all programme activities in order to ensure consistency. This manual should be developed and problems should be located and resolved through pilot implementation procedures done by or in close cooperation with the MOD and other public structures.



- The amount of assistance provided by the international community – particularly in those cases in which multiple downsizings are anticipated – should be kept consistent. As it has occurred in BiH, support for redundant personnel has varied rather extensively based on the year in which they were discharged, a situation which has fostered resentment and confusion.
- Sustainability initiatives – particularly those related to economic networking – should be considered at the time of programme design and be pursued throughout.
- Assistance should be planned in advance and provided immediately following military downsizing and not, as in the case of those discharged in 2004, between three and four years later.
- Finally, assistance should be timed in a manner as to separate it from political concerns. The October 2006 elections and the national political tactics surrounding them hampered implementation and the publication of lists of personnel to be made redundant.

These recommendations, it is anticipated, should allow for more successful future interventions. However, the NTF Programme was not a failure for their lack. Rather, it was a successful Programme which, due to missteps on the part of the international community and Executing Agency, missed opportunities to expand its effectiveness and the development of public institutions.



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## 7. Conclusion

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The NTF Programme fully met its objectives. Its beneficiaries received assistance in making the transition from the military or MOD to civilian life, and almost all demonstrated or anticipated economic benefits as a result of the intervention. High rates of independent beneficiary contributions and sustainability suggest that improvements will not be short-lived as they may have been within past programmes targeting redundant military personnel. A learning process has clearly occurred across time.

Furthermore, despite concerns related to implementation, current Programme management seems excellent. Most encouraging was the Executing Agency's awareness of nearly every concern raised by the evaluation team and the ongoing development of plans to address them. Implementing staff, several of whom have experience with programme management in central Africa, Afghanistan and Switzerland, were found to be highly qualified and effective. Indeed, in the future, IOM should consider the possibility of recruiting national staff members to fill top management positions.

Challenges and areas of concern have been noted within this report. As a mid-term evaluation, it is intended to highlight such areas and provide recommendations for ameliorating them. It has done so, and the evaluation team particularly looks forward to thorough and quick attention to critical areas such as governmental capacity building, gender and sustainability.

The evaluation, however, is not only of the intervention as delivered by the Executing Agency but also, to a far lesser extent, of the international actors which have generously supported it. The close involvement of the Lead Nations and NATO was found to be excellent, as was their willingness and ability to effectively communicate challenges faced during implementation to hierarchical superiors in Brussels. It is now hoped that this high degree of flexibility will allow for an extension and potentially the allocation of additional funds in order to solidify and extend the NTF Programme's economic impact. **The evaluation team would like to state clearly that 'sustainability initiatives', while unfortunately proposed more than mid-way through the Programme, have the potential to substantially increase the socio-economic position of redundant military and MOD personnel with a marginally minor increase in funds. Implementing partners for sub-grants have been identified, and they should be given the resources and time to ensure that more advanced forms of assistance such as processing, packaging, marketing and agricultural cooperatives and associations are realised.**

The evaluation team would, finally, like to express its gratitude to all those informants with whom we met. The interest expressed by the UK Military Attaché, Col Roger Batho, was particularly appreciated. IOM's facilitation of the evaluation was excellent not only in terms of logistics but also with regard to transparency. IOM staff members put the evaluators in contact with a highly representative – and at times troubled or somewhat less successful – group of beneficiaries rather than only with success stories. Furthermore, IOM staff members were clearly free to support the evaluation and to discuss, explore and critique the Programme. This evaluation owes a great deal to their insightfulness and critical approach to their work.



## Annex A. Institutional Informants

No	Name	Title	Affiliation	Relation to NTF Programme
1	Mr Omer Korijenec	Head of Sector for Employment	Federation Employment Institute	Uninvolved Stakeholder
2	Mr Gustavo D'Angelo	Country Director	CARE Northwest Balkans Office	None, Outside Observer
3	Mr Nedeljko Veselinovic	Director	Republika Srpska Employment Institute	Uninvolved Stakeholder
4	Ms Lisa Golden	First Secretary	Royal Norwegian Embassy	LSB Member, NATO Focal Point
5	Dr Raffi Gregorian	Principal Deputy High Representative	Office of the High Representative	Initial Advocate of NTF Programme
6	Mr Rohan Maxwell	Politico-Military Adviser	NATO HQ Sarajevo	Involved Observer, standing in for Bruce McLane
7	Ms Lejla Mulic	Financial Advisor	NATO HQ Sarajevo	LSB Member
8	Ms Esmā Hadzagic	Assistant Minister	BiH Ministry of Civil Affairs, Education Sector	Uninvolved Stakeholder
9	Mr Nedo Batinic	Projects Preparation Expert/Advisor	MOD Transition Team	LSB Member, Transition Team Member
10	Mr Hasret Turkovic	Monitoring and Coordination Expert/Advisor	MOD Transition Team	LSB Member, Transition Team Member
11	Col Roger Batho	Defence Attaché	Embassy of the United Kingdom	LSB Member, Lead Nation Representative
12	Mr Sead Muratovic	Assistant Minister	MOD, Department for Personnel	LSB Member
13	Col Nenad Predovan	Military Attaché	Embassy of the Republic of Croatia	LSB Member, Lead Nation Representative
14	Ms Admina Pandzic	Expert for NATO/PfP Programmes	MOD, International Cooperation Department	Involved Observer
15	Mr Jongoa Radovan	Agricultural Inspector	Nevesinje Municipality	Involved Observer
16	Mr Rade Mavrak	Director, Agriculture Department	Nevesinje Municipality	Involved Observer
17	Mr Nebosa Borlica	Veterinary Inspector	Nevesinje Municipality	Involved Observer
18	Mr Slavisa Jelusic	Director	Local Initiative for Development, Banja Luka NGO	Involved Observer
19	O. Tipuric	Point of Contact	Mostar Barracks	Involved Stakeholder



## Annex B. Beneficiary/RP Informants

The chart below includes those beneficiaries interviewed in the course of the field work.

No	Location	Context	Sex	Year of Discharge	Assistance Type
1	Banja Luka	Urban	M	2004	Self-Employment Expansion
2	Banja Luka	Urban	F	2004	Self-Employment Expansion
3	Laktasi (Banja Luka AoR)	Suburban	F	2004	Agriculture
4	Prijedor (Banja Luke AoR)	Rural	M	2004	Agriculture
5	Prijedor (Banja Luke AoR)	Rural	F	2007	Agriculture
6	Prijedor (Banja Luke AoR)	Rural	M	2007	Agriculture
7	Prijedor (Banja Luke AoR)	Rural	M	2004	Agriculture
8	Prijedor (Banja Luke AoR)	Rural	M	2004	Agriculture
9	Prijedor (Banja Luke AoR)	Urban	M	2004	Education/Training
10	Banja Luka	Urban	M	2004	Self-Employment Start-Up
11	Banja Luka	Urban	M	2004	Employment
12	Nevesinje (Mostar AoR)	Rural	M	2004	Agriculture
13	Nevesinje (Mostar AoR)	Rural	M	2004	Agriculture
14	Nevesinje (Mostar AoR)	Suburban	M	2004	Self-Employment Expansion
15	Nevesinje (Mostar AoR)	Rural	M	2004	Agriculture
16	Nevesinje (Mostar AoR)	Suburban	M	2004	Self-Employment Expansion
17	Caplijna (Mostar AoR)	Rural	M	2004	Education/Training
18	Trebinje (Mostar AoR)	Rural	M	2007	Agriculture
19	Trebinje (Mostar AoR)	Rural	M	2004	Self-Employment Expansion
20	Trebinje (Mostar AoR)	Rural	M	2004	Employment
21	Trebinje (Mostar AoR)	Rural	M	2004	Self-Employment Start-Up
22	Trebinje (Mostar AoR)	Rural	M	2004	Self-Employment Start-Up
23	Pale (Rajlovac AoR)	Rural	F	2004	Agriculture
24	Rogatica (Rajlovac AoR)	Rural	M	2004	Self-Employment Expansion
25	Sokolac (Rajlovac AoR)	Rural	M	2004	Agricultural



<b>26</b>	Sokolac (Rajlovac AoR)	Suburban	F	2004	Self-Employment Start-Up
<b>27</b>	Sokolac (Rajlovac AoR)	Suburban	M	2007	Self-Employment Start-Up
<b>28</b>	Zenica (Rajlovac AoR)	Rural	M	2004	Agriculture
<b>29</b>	Zenica (Rajlovac AoR)	Urban	M	2004	Self-Employment Start-Up
<b>30</b>	Zenica (Rajlovac AoR)	Urban	M	2004	Employment



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## **Annex C. Survey**

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Please see the survey attached on the subsequent two pages.

**ASSISTED RP SURVEY**

Initials:	No.
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**FOR SURVEYOR**

Gender of RP:            MALE                      FEMALE

Disability:    YES                      NO                      If yes, what kind? \_\_\_\_\_

What is the name of the municipality? \_\_\_\_\_ Entity?    RS    FBiH (circle)

Would you describe the area as:            URBAN                      RURAL                      SUBURBAN ?                      (circle one)

How many RPs (total, registered) are there in this municipality? \_\_\_\_\_

Your Name: \_\_\_\_\_ Date: \_\_\_\_\_

- |   |  |
|---|--|
| <p>1. What is your age?</p> <p>2. When were you made redundant?</p> <p>3. What was your previous position in the military/MOD?</p> <p>4. How many years were you in the military/MOD?</p> <p>5. Why did you leave the military/MOD?</p> <p>6. What reintegration option/package did you receive?</p> <p>7. Are you engaged in full-time employment?</p> <p>8. What is your present job?</p> <p>9. How many hours do you work at your NTF-assisted livelihood per week?</p> <p>10. Are you better off now than when you were in the military/MOD?</p> <p>11. If you had a job or business before NTF-assistance, are you better off now than with that earlier job/business?</p> <p>12. For how many people does your income provide the majority of their basic needs (in terms of food, shelter, clothing &amp; education)?</p> <p>13. What percentage of household income do other people in your household provide? (Include pensions and benefits.)</p> <p>14. Are you able to save money earned from your NTF-assisted job/business or use profits to expand your job/business?</p> <p>15. Have you made any large purchases (car, livestock, etc.) since receiving NTF assistance?</p> <p>16. How would you rate the quality of the assistance received (whether training, agricultural materials, equipment, etc.)</p> | <p>1. _____ years</p> <p>2. <b>2004</b>      <b>2006/7</b>      (circle one)</p> <p>3. <b>Soldier</b>                      <b>Military/Non-Com</b><br/><b>Civil Servant</b>                      <b>Officer</b></p> <p>4. _____ years</p> <p>5. Circle one.<br/>a. left voluntarily    b. forced<br/>c. retired    d. health    e. other</p> <p>6. a. <b>Agriculture</b>    b. <b>Placement</b><br/>c. <b>SME Start-Up</b>    d. <b>SME Expan.</b><br/>e. <b>Education/Training</b></p> <p>7. <b>Yes</b>                      <b>No</b>      (circle one)</p> <p>8. _____</p> <p>9. _____</p> <p>10. <b>Yes</b>                      <b>No</b>      (circle one)</p> <p>11. <b>Yes</b>                      <b>No</b>      (circle one)</p> <p>12. _____</p> <p>13. _____ %</p> <p>14. <b>Yes</b>                      <b>No</b>      (circle one)</p> <p>15. <b>Yes</b>                      <b>No</b>      (circle one)</p> <p>16. <b>Good</b>                      <b>Fair</b>                      <b>Poor</b></p> |
|---|--|

17. Do you think that you will still be doing this same job/business in 5 years?  
 a. If NO, why not?
18. Do you have any debt?
19. Have you taken out a loan since receiving NTF assistance?  
 a. From whom - a bank/MFI or from friends and family?  
 b. Was the loan for your NTF-assisted job/business?
20. If you could change the category of assistance (from the 5 available to RPs) received, would you?  
 If YES, what option/package would you select instead?
21. Did you feel pressure from NTF/IOM staff to select a particular category of assistance from the 5 available?
22. Do you now consider yourself a member of the military/MoD?
23. Do you feel people respect you MORE now than when you were in the army/MOD?
24. Do you feel people respect you LESS now than when you were in the army/MOD?
25. Would you say your job/business is more or less successful than other RPs who received NTF assistance?
26. Would you say your job/business is more or less successful than other RPs who did not receive NTF assistance?
27. Do you belong to an ex-soldiers' association or a similar group?

17. **Yes**            **No**    (circle one)  
 a. Circle one option from below  
   - Job not profitable enough  
   - Plan to go back to school  
   - Plan to try and join military/MOD again  
   - Other
18. **Yes**            **No**    (circle one)
19. **Yes**            **No**    (circle one)  
      **Bank/MFI**            **Friend/Family**  
      **Yes**                **No**    (circle one)
20. **Yes**            **No**    (circle one)  
 IF YES, circle one below  
   **a. Agriculture    b. Placement**  
   **c. SME Start-Up   d. SME Expan.**  
   **e. Education/Training**
21. **Yes**            **No**    (circle one)
22. **Yes**            **No**    (circle one)
23. **Yes**            **No**    (circle one)
24. **Yes**            **No**    (circle one)
25. **Less**            **Same**            **More**
26. **Less**            **Same**            **More**
27. **Yes**            **No**    (circle one)

COMMENTS:        Please use this space to write down any interesting comments, stories or examples provided by the RP during the delivery of the survey.

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## Annex D. Selected Survey Results & Analysis

Data	Composite	Banja Luka AoR	Rajlovac AoR	Mostar AoR
<i>Sample Size</i>	92	35	25	32
Hours, weekly, dedicated to NTF livelihood	23.8	15.1	22.9	33.5
'Better off' than in the Military or Entity MOD (%)	32.6	37.1	28	31.3
'Better off' than immediate post-demobilisation period, 2004-07 (%)	68.5	82.9	52	65.6
NTF contribution to household income (%)	22.4	21.5	24.6	21
Able to accumulate savings or profits (%)	8.7	14.3	8	3.1
Beneficiaries who made recent (post-NTF) major purchase (car, equipment, etc.) (%)	7.6	8.6	16	0
NTF-assisted enterprise will still be functioning in 5 years (%)	89.1	88.6	92	87.5
Beneficiary would like to change type of assistance received (%)	8.7	8.6	8	9.4
Sense of improved respect since leaving military/MOD (%)	20.7	25.7	16	18.8

**ANALYSIS** These statistics are interesting for a number of reasons. First, the importance of keeping ex-soldiers 'busy' seems to only have been partly met (if, indeed, it could be described as a goal of this Programme). The part-time nature of NTF-assisted livelihoods is most pronounced in Banja Luka AoR, where beneficiaries give approximately 15 hours per week, as opposed to the Mostar AoR where more than twice as much is dedicated. Such differences, admittedly, may reflect differences in surveyors' understandings of the questions (which were provided in the local language with instructions). Furthermore, these statistics raise the question of why individuals seem most context – relative to their time in the military or MOD or immediately thereafter – in the Banja Luka AoR. Regardless, it remains apparent that a sizable number of people – slightly less than a third – are better now than in the military or MOD, a major accomplishment. The improvement relative to the immediate post-demobilisation years (for those made redundant in 2004) is also impressive but to-be expected.

The low relative contribution of NTF assistance to household income is also relatively low. Again, as with the level of time dedicated to them, NTF-assisted livelihoods are primarily side or part-time ventures which supplement core economic activities or benefits. As such, the low rate of savings is also disappointing though unsurprising given the weak state of the economy and rising food and fuel prices. It is far more encouraging to see such high rates of sustainability. It should be noted that, most commonly, those who indicated that their livelihood would not be in existence in five years said so due to its low rate of return. Such individuals almost universally felt that they would have to abandon their NTF-assisted livelihood and try something else.



Finally, the high rate of beneficiary satisfaction – 89.1 per cent – with selected types of assistance is encouraging. Even those who indicated a preference to change the type of assistance requested often had technical changes in the exact item requested rather than a desire to attempt an entirely different livelihood. Those questions not discussed in this brief analysis section, it should be noted, are excluded only because the results were not deemed significant either statistically or for methodological reasons. For example, the purchase of major items seems to have been understood differently by various surveyors.

Data	Composite	Soldiers	Civilians (in Military or MOD)	Officers
<i>Sample Size</i>	92	40	21	31
'Better off' than in the Military or Entity MOD (%)	32.6	35	38.1	25.8
NTF contribution to household income (%)	22.4	16.3	24.1	28.1
Sense of improved respect since leaving military/MOD (%)	20.7	25.0	23.8	12.9

**ANALYSIS** Fewer variations than anticipated were found on the basis of rank. Overall, they spent similar amounts of time on their NTF-assisted livelihoods and reported similar rates of sustainability. Minor differences were noted, however, and pertain most notably to the particular role of officers. They are the least likely to feel 'better off' than when in the military and have experienced the least gains in terms of self-perceived social standing or respect. Furthermore, their NTF-assisted livelihood contributes the most to their households which, in the evaluators' opinion, is based on the fact that many possessed technical skills – including those related to mechanics and computers – which allowed them to set up relatively successful businesses. However, as is further discussed in the box below, this may also result from the fact that older beneficiaries possessed fewer sources of income, thus making NTF-linked livelihoods more relative.

The remaining question is one of self-perception. Give that they feel the least gains in respect and the most likely to feel worse off than in the military – globally common trends among demobilised officers – it is worth asking whether or not they could pose a security risk. While such a risk is considered exceptionally unlikely, nullifying it altogether and assisting in the social reintegration of former officers may be best pursued through the provision of specifically tailored roles – as leaders of associations or 'group leaders' for redundant personnel – to former officers. In BiH as elsewhere, it is their identities (and egos) which require more attention than their pocketbooks.

**A Note on Age**

The correlation between age and rank – with officers being more likely to be older – helps to explain some of these trends. For instance, while 38.3 per cent of beneficiaries under the age of 40 were likely to feel better off following NTF assistance than in the military or MOD, this figure was only 26.7 per cent for those aged 40 or above. Also, older individuals, who would presumably possess fewer non-military skills, often needed to rely more heavily on income from their NTF-assisted livelihood. For beneficiaries older than 45, 26.1 per cent of their household income was derived from NTF-assisted livelihoods as opposed to 17.8 per cent for beneficiaries 40 or younger.



## Annex E. Approval/Delivery Times for Select Items

Type of RAPP	Submission to Approval (mean, days)	Approval to Delivery (mean, days)	Submission to Delivery (mean, days)
Animals - Bees <sup>15</sup>	26	169	195
Animals - Bullocks	15	114	129
Animals - Chicken	19	52	71
Animals - Pigs	11	134	145
Animals - Pregnant heifer	13	134	147
Animals - Sheeps	14	153	167
Greenhouse	17	73	90
Fruits/vegetable production	13	104	117
Mechanisation	17	62	79
Computers/IT equipment	26	50	76
Construction	45	122	167
Tools	31	72	103
Transportation	11	52	63
Maintenance and repair of motor vehicles	48	93	141
Equipment	36	70	106
Language course	3	122	125
Re-qualification	3	29	32
Secondary School	2	51	53
Faculty	24	33	57

<sup>15</sup> It is important to note that delivery times for certain forms of agricultural assistance – livestock and bees – were not delayed but rather postponed until the appropriate season for delivery. As such, a beneficiary whose request for bees was approved in October 2007 may have had to wait until May through July until the weather was appropriate for delivery. In such cases, delays are in fact not delays but are necessary postponements.



Employment	19	62	81
Other	15	72	87
<b>MEAN (Unweighted)</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>86</b>	<b>107</b>



## ANNEX F. IOM & BENEFICIARY CONTRIBUTIONS

Statistics	Area					
	Banja Luka					
	Agro	Educ	Employ	SME Exp.	SME Start	Total
No. of projects	295	6	8	75	71	455
No. of Projects completed	208	4	2	56	54	324
Percentage completed (%)	71	67	25	75	76	71
No. of beneficiaries contributing to projects	101	0	2	4	4	111
Total amount contributed	55,491	0	983	3,765	891	61,130
Average amount contributed	549	0	491	941	223	551
Percentage of beneficiaries contributing to projects (%)	34	0	25	5	6	24
Total IOM contribution	687,762	5,640	15,823	154,225	133,110	996,560
Average IOM contribution	2,492	1,128	2,260	2,113	2,017	2,323

Statistics	Area					
	Mostar					
	Agro	Educ	Employ	SME Exp.	SME Start	Total
No. of projects	300	8	14	62	26	410
No. of Projects completed	219	1	10	37	20	287
Percentage completed (%)	73	13	71	60	77	70
No. of beneficiaries contributing to projects	127	1	2	7	3	140
Total amount contributed	67,711	1,500	485	9,944	4,803	84,443
Average amount contributed	533	1,500	242	1,421	1,601	603
Percentage of beneficiaries contributing to projects (%)	42	13	14	11	12	34
Total IOM contribution	759,224	10,990	22,034	115,232	52,340	959,820
Average IOM contribution	2,683	1,374	1,695	2,174	2,181	2,519

Statistics	Area					
	Rajlovac					
	Agro	Educ	Employ	SME Exp.	SME Start	Total
No. of projects	290	7	34	40	70	441
No. of Projects completed	44	5	19	24	38	130
Percentage completed (%)	15	72	56	60	54	29
No. of beneficiaries contributing to projects	111	0	2	2	4	119
Total amount contributed	61,112	0	1,550	670	2,089	65,421
Average amount contributed	550	0	775	335	522	550
Percentage of beneficiaries contributing to projects (%)	38	0	6	5	6	27
Total IOM contribution	682,770	8,467	70,896	66,161	124,033	952,327
Average IOM contribution	2,677	1,209	2,206	2,205	2,138	2,493



## ANNEX G. EVALUATION TERMS OF REFERENCE

**NATO/PfP Trust Fund Programme for Assistance to Redundant Military Personnel in  
Bosnia and Herzegovina  
Independent Mid-Term Evaluation  
Preliminary Terms of Reference  
(August 2008)**

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### Background:

Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) is strongly engaged in a comprehensive process of defence reform, resulting in a substantial reduction of personnel in Defence institutions and the BiH Armed Forces.

NATO is supporting the defence reform efforts of BiH, notably through the Tailored Cooperation Programme and the Defence Reform Commission. In addition, the NATO/PfP Trust Fund (NTF) was also set up by NATO Member States and other donors to assist the Ministry of Defence (MoD) of BiH with the reintegration of personnel made redundant as a result of this reform by addressing some of the direct socio-economic consequences of the downsizing process by helping and supporting concrete reintegration measures in favour of redundant personnel. The three Lead Nations the NTF Programme in BiH are the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Croatia. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) serves as Executing Agency for the Programme.

The objective of the NTF Programme is to facilitate the financial independence of beneficiaries discharged in 2004 and 2006/7, with priority given to those discharged in the latter period, and to assist them in their transition to civilian life through education, vocational counselling and training, referrals and the provision of tool kits/equipment for employment or self-employment. The Programme is implemented in two phases: the first including an information campaign, registration and data processing, and analysis of beneficiary profiles; and the second involving the set-up of IOM field offices, information mapping of potential service providers, and implementation of reintegration projects.

### Aims of the Evaluation:

The project document specifically notes that IOM will identify an external independent evaluator to conduct a thorough assessment of the Programme and its results and make recommendations for its continuous effectiveness in its second phase. Specifically, the evaluation should:

- Assess the outcome and performance of the Programme; including the extent to which its purposes were achieved in an efficient manner and the sustainability of the project results
- Assess the elements of the Programme that may warrant corrective measures in order to reach the expected impact
- Help those responsible for developing and implementing the Programme in taking appropriate decisions and targeted responses toward broader long-term initiatives
- Provide comparisons with similar comprehensive approach methodologies within other countries of the region in order to develop a best practice model for future projects



- Identify and analyze good practices and lessons learned in the implementation and operation of the Programme
- Conduct a rapid assessment of the impact of the Programme on the MoD and its capacity to conduct resettlement activities
- Formulate concrete recommendations for continuous effectiveness

Methodology:

The evaluation should be global in its approach, results-based and action-oriented, providing feedback for the on-going design and implementation of the Programme. The Team will collect qualitative and quantitative data from IOM including programme documentation, databases and progress reports, as well as through fieldwork. Fieldwork may include the organization of focus groups, qualitative interviews with Programme stakeholders – including government officials and beneficiaries as well as members of the international community and donors – sample surveys if feasible, and field observation in the Programme locations. In addition, the Team should interview IOM staff in BiH and in headquarters, as well as representatives from NATO, the Lead Nations, and the MoD.

Deliverables:

- Preliminary report - highlighting recommendations - within 15 days from the completion of BiH fieldwork; and
- Final report within 10 days from delivery of the preliminary report